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EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR NON-
EMPLOYEE DISCRIMINATION 
DALLAN F. FLAKE* 
Abstract: Discrimination against employees by customers, vendors, and other 
third parties is a serious issue that will likely become even more pressing in 
the near future. Increased workplace interactions between employees and non-
employees, coupled with the societal shift toward subtle, covert, and some-
times even unconscious discrimination, mean non-employee discrimination is 
likely to become more pervasive—even as it becomes harder to detect. As this 
perfect storm brews, it is worth considering how judicial treatment of non-
employee discrimination can be improved. I argue that one of the most im-
portant changes needed is for the law to cease treating discrimination by non-
employees and discrimination by fellow employees as one and the same. 
These forms of discrimination should be analytically distinct because employ-
ers generally cannot exercise the same degree of control over non-employees 
as they can over their own employees. The law can best account for this cru-
cial distinction by holding employers to a reasonableness standard for non-
employee discrimination. Under this standard, employers would be liable for 
the discriminatory actions of third parties if: (1) they knew or should reasona-
bly have known about the discrimination and (2) failed to act reasonably in re-
sponse to the discrimination. This approach apportions liability more com-
mensurately with the level of control employers can realistically exercise over 
non-employees, while still incentivizing employers to aggressively monitor 
and address non-employee discrimination. 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the fact that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly 
forbids only employers (and, by extension, employees) from discriminating 
against employees,1 courts have long interpreted the statute as also prohibit-
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 * Assistant Professor of Law, Claude W. Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern University. I 
presented earlier versions of this Article at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting in 
New Orleans, Louisiana, in June 2016, and the Colloquium on Scholarship in Employment and 
Labor Law in Seattle, Washington, in September 2016, and would like to express my gratitude to 
participants at both conferences for their helpful comments on this project. I would also like to 
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 1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (it is “an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
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ing employers from allowing third parties to discriminate against employ-
ees.2 Employers who fail to adequately protect their employees from non-
employee discrimination face serious repercussions. For example, a Kansas 
City-area jury recently awarded over $2.5 million to an AutoZone cashier, 
who claimed the auto parts retailer failed to take action after customers in-
appropriately touched her, asked her about her “cup size,” and made sexual 
advances toward her on multiple occasions.3 Likewise, retail supermarket 
chain Fred Meyer paid out nearly half a million dollars to settle a group of 
female employees’ claims that a customer “continually made lewd com-
ments to [them], in addition to grabbing [them], cornering them, touching 
their breasts, and pulling one employee onto his lap.”4 Non-employee dis-
crimination is not limited to incidents of harassment. For instance, Michi-
gan-based Hurley Medical Center recently paid almost $200,000 to three 
black nurses who were prohibited from caring for a white baby after the 
baby’s father showed a hospital supervisor his swastika tattoo and insisted 
that no black nurses treat his child.5 
                                                                                                                           
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin”); see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) 
(2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer to . . . discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual’s age.”); Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 
U.S.C. § 4311(a)-(c) (2012) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against uniformed service 
members); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12112(a) (2012) 
(prohibiting “covered entities,” including employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, 
and joint labor-management committees, from discriminating “against a qualified individual on 
the basis of disability”). 
 2 See infra notes 135–274 and accompanying text (discussing court opinions regarding em-
ployee discrimination by third parties). 
 3 See Diaz v. Autozoner’s, LLC, No. 1216-cv28445, 2014 WL 1193878, at *2 (Mo. Cir. Feb. 
3, 2014); Abby Eden, Damages Awarded to AutoZone Employee in Sexual Harassment Lawsuit, 
FOX4KC.COM (Feb. 6, 2014, 9:54 PM), http://fox4kc.com/2014/02/06/damages-awarded-to-
autozone-employee-in-sexual-harassment-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/B73G-GCRF]. The appellate 
court upheld the verdict but reduced the size of the award to $1,075,000. See Diaz v. Autozoners, 
LLC, 484 S.W.3d 64, 95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
 4 See Press Release, EEOC, Retailer Fred Meyer Settles Second EEOC Sexual Harassment 
Lawsuit (May 5, 2014), https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/release/5-5-14a.cfm?renderfor
print=1 [https://perma.cc/5S7G-KCPB]. In response to the settlement, harassment victim Victoria 
Settle commented, “I was terrorized at work and so stressed worrying about what would happen 
when this customer came into the store . . . . All I ever wanted was for my employer to do some-
thing to stop him, and I hope that this settlement means Fred Meyer will not let anything like this 
happen again.” Id. 
 5 See Gary Ridley, Hurley Settles Race Discrimination Complaint That Claimed Black Nurses 
Were Banned from Treating White Baby in Flint, MLIVE (Sept. 27, 2013, 10:44 AM), http://
www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/09/hurley_settles_race_discrimina.html [https://perma.
cc/K2E6-F5UT]; see also Press Release, EEOC, Hurley Medical Center Agrees to Settle EEOC 
Race Discrimination Case (Sept. 26, 2013), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-26-
13e.cfm [https://perma.cc/J5J8-XJB3]. 
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Employer liability for non-employee discrimination dates back at least 
four decades.6 Yet despite its persistence, this form of discrimination has 
received little attention from courts,7 the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”),8 and legal scholars.9 This dearth of attention is not 
necessarily surprising, given the tendency in the law to treat discrimination 
by non-employees and discrimination by employees as one and the same. 
Indeed, courts have long assumed—without much analysis—that employers 
should be equally liable for discrimination that comes from employees and 
non-employees.10 Consequently, there has been little incentive to explore 
how these forms of discrimination differ and whether such differences call 
for different treatment under the law.11 
This Article seeks to shed much-needed light on non-employee dis-
crimination. I argue that discrimination by non-employees differs from dis-
crimination committed by employees in ways that matter for employer-
liability purposes. The most glaring difference is that employers typically 
cannot exercise the same level of control over non-employees as they do 
over their own employees when it comes to employment discrimination.12 
Employers have a variety of tools at their disposal to prevent, detect, and 
address employee-on-employee discrimination. Indeed, many employers 
provide annual antidiscrimination training to employees, establish strict 
handbook policies and workplace rules against discrimination, and imple-
ment mandatory discrimination-reporting requirements. They also have the 
power to punish employees who violate such policies, whether through 
                                                                                                                           
 6 The earliest reference to employer liability for non-employee discrimination appears to date 
back to 1971, when a California federal district court observed that “[i]f the employer were per-
mitted to discriminate because other employees, his customers or third persons, were prejudiced 
against minorities, the effort to break the desperate ring of discrimination would soon fail.” John-
son v. Pike Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 490, 496 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
 7 See infra notes 135–274 and accompanying text (analyzing judicial treatment of non-
employee discrimination). 
 8 The EEOC has been uncharacteristically restrained in its guidance on non-employee discrimi-
nation. Its most detailed analysis of the issue consists of an informal discussion letter authored by its 
assistant legal counsel in 2012. Letter from Carol R. Miaskoff, Assistant Legal Counsel, EEOC, to 
Member of the Public (Oct. 1, 2012) https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2012/title_vii_third-
party_citizen_harassment.html [https://perma.cc/36RQ-88UT]. 
 9 See generally, e.g., Lea B. Vaughn, The Customer Is Always Right . . . Not! Employer Lia-
bility for Third Party Sexual Harassment, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2002); Lu-in Wang, When 
the Customer Is King: Employment Discrimination as Customer Service, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 249 (2016); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and 
the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357 (2009). 
 10 See infra notes 135–274 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 135–274 and accompanying text. 
 12 See John C. Schlinker & Matthew K. Payok, The Customer Is Not Always Right, MICH. 
BAR J., Jan. 2005, at 30, https://www.michbar.org/file/barjournal/article/documents/pdf4article
830.pdf. 
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formal warnings, suspensions, demotions, or termination. By contrast, em-
ployers generally have much less control over non-employees’ behavior 
toward employees.13 Aside from posting a code of conduct, which third par-
ties may or may not read,14 and perhaps banning flagrant offenders from 
their premises, employers have comparatively few options for effectively 
combatting discrimination by non-employees. The fact that it is often harder 
to control non-employees’ behavior should not absolve employers from lia-
bility for non-employee discrimination—but it should factor into the analy-
sis. To this end, I propose replacing the extant framework, which fails to 
recognize any difference between employee and non-employee discrimina-
tion, with a new approach that ties an employer’s liability to its actual or 
constructive knowledge of and response to non-employee discrimination. 
Under this two-pronged approach, an employer’s liability would depend on 
(1) whether it knew or should have reasonably known about the non-
employee discrimination and (2) whether it acted reasonably in response to 
the discrimination. This standard would apportion employer liability more 
commensurately with the level of control employers can realistically exer-
cise over non-employees, while still incentivizing employers to monitor and 
address non-employee discrimination in a reasonable manner. 
This Article begins by exploring why non-employee discrimination 
will likely become even more pervasive in the near future. In Part I, I attrib-
ute this trend to two key developments. First, as the United States continues 
to transition to a predominately service-based economy, the frequency of 
employee-non-employee interactions will only increase, thereby providing 
more opportunities for non-employees to discriminate.15 Moreover, in the 
service economy, third parties are increasingly inserting themselves in the 
traditional bilateral employer-employee relationship, whereby they both 
directly and indirectly influence an array of employing functions from hir-
ing, promotion, and firing to compensation and job assignments.16 Second, 
as organizations become increasingly complex and interdependent, work-
places are becoming populated by a wide range of third parties, such as 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See id. 
 14 See, e.g., COLUMBUS METRO. LIBRARY, CUSTOMER CODE OF CONDUCT, http://www.
columbuslibrary.org/about/customer-code-conduct [https://perma.cc/KFH5-K2VG] (prohibiting 
patrons from “[h]arassing customers or staff,” which it defines as “[d]eliberate repeated behavior 
that is intimidating, hostile, offensive, or adversely impacts staff work performance”). 
 15 See infra notes 30–70 and accompanying text. See generally Donald M. Fisk, American Labor 
in the 20th Century, COMPENSATION & WORKING CONDITIONS (Fall 2001), https://www.bls.
gov/opub/mlr/cwc/american-labor-in-the-20th-century.pdf [https://perma.cc/KEG2-MK4Z] (dis-
cussing the increasing percentage of workers in the service industry from 1900 to 2000). 
 16 See Einat Albin, A Worker-Employer-Customer Triangle: The Case of Tips, 40 INDUS. L. J. 
181, 182 (2011); infra notes 31–46 and accompanying text. 
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vendors, suppliers, temporary employees, and independent contractors.17 In 
short, as the economy becomes more service driven and interdependent, 
interactions—and, consequently, discrimination—between non-employees 
and employees will likely increase. 
In Part II, I consider the various ways in which non-employees discrimi-
nate against employees.18 In the past, non-employee discrimination was often 
conscious and either direct (such as when a customer sexually harassed a 
waitress) or indirect (such as when airlines hired only female flight attendants 
based on customer preference). But as antidiscrimination norms take deeper 
root in American society, discrimination is becoming more subtle, uninten-
tional, and even unconscious. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly common for 
non-employees to unconsciously discriminate against employees, both direct-
ly, such as when restaurant diners unintentionally tip black servers less than 
white servers, and indirectly, such as when customers give implicitly biased 
feedback to employers that is then used to make employment decisions. In 
essence, a perfect storm is brewing in which non-employee discrimination is 
becoming more commonplace, yet harder to detect. 
Part III examines how the courts analyze non-employee discrimination 
claims. 19 Because the law does not distinguish between non-employee and 
employee discrimination, the courts apply the same analytical frameworks to 
both types of discrimination despite key differences between these two actors. 
Thus, in non-employee harassment cases, courts ask whether the employer 
had actual or constructive knowledge of the discrimination and, if so, whether 
it promptly acted to end the harassment.20 In customer-preference-driven dis-
parate treatment cases, courts consider whether the discrimination can be jus-
tified as a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) that is reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of the employer’s business.21 In customer-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 48–70 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 71–134 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 135–247 and accompanying text. 
 20 See Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 137 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[B]ecause . . . em-
ployers must provide their personnel with a harassment-free workplace, they may be on the hook 
for a non-employee’s sexually-harassing behavior under certain conditions—one of which being 
that they knew or should have known about the harassment and yet failed to take prompt steps to 
stop it”); Anda v. Wickes Furniture Co., 517 F.3d 526, 531–32 (8th Cir. 2008) (an employer is 
liable for non-employee harassment if “the employer knew or should have known of the harass-
ment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action”); infra notes 138–204 and accompa-
nying text. 
 21 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (“It shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to [discriminate 
against an employee based on age] where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) 
(“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer [to discriminate] . . . on the 
basis of [an employee’s or applicant’s] religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances 
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-
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preference-driven disparate impact cases, where employers create facially 
neutral policies based on customer preferences that disparately impact a pro-
tected group, the courts ask whether the policy is job related and consistent 
with business necessity.22 Thus, sometimes an employer is liable for non-
employee discrimination only if it had actual or constructive knowledge of 
the discrimination,23 but other times employer knowledge plays no role in the 
analysis.24 Further, in some cases an employer can avoid liability by showing 
the discrimination was necessary to the operation of its business,25 whereas in 
other cases business necessity carries no weight.26 I contend that the applica-
tion of these varying doctrines and frameworks to non-employee discrimina-
tion is unnecessarily confusing and has generated a fragmented and incon-
sistent case law. 
I argue in Part IV that the existing judicial approach to non-employee 
discrimination is fundamentally unfair and can be improved by acknowl-
edging that employers cannot monitor, deter, or remediate the discriminato-
ry behavior of non-employees as effectively as they can their own employ-
ees.27 If the law is going to continue holding employers solely liable for the 
discriminatory actions of non-employees, while essentially giving non-
employees a free pass to discriminate, it is only fair that the liability stand-
ard account for employers’ diminished control over non-employees. Replac-
ing the existing hodgepodge of frameworks and doctrines with a reasona-
bleness standard would not only strike a more equitable balance between 
employer liability and control but would also create a single, unified ap-
proach to non-employee discrimination that allows employers greater flexi-
bility in how best to address the issue. Furthermore, a reasonableness stand-
ard would have the added benefit of being broad enough to apply to all 
forms of non-employee discrimination, including the harder-to-detect un-
conscious discrimination that is becoming more pervasive in modern socie-
ty. 
                                                                                                                           
sary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .”); infra notes 205–271 
and accompanying text. 
 22 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (stating that an employer is not liable for facially neu-
tral employment practices and policies that disparately impact a protected group if it can prove the 
policy is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity”). 
 23 See infra notes 138–201 and accompanying text (analyzing judicial treatment of harassment 
by non-employees). 
 24 See infra notes 208–262 and accompanying text (analyzing judicial treatment of disparate 
impact cases). 
 25 See infra notes 202–274 and accompanying text (analyzing judicial treatment of discrimi-
natory preferences and requests by non-employees). 
 26 See infra notes 138–201 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 275–317 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE GROWTH OF NON-EMPLOYEE DISCRIMINATION 
Employees are more vulnerable to discrimination by non-employees 
than ever before. This is due to the fact that in the modern workplace employ-
ees are more likely to interact regularly with non-employees, thus heightening 
the possibility of discrimination.28 More frequent interactions between em-
ployees and non-employees result from two important developments. First, as 
the United States transitions from a manufacturing to a service-based econo-
my, interactions between employees and customers have increased exponen-
tially.29 Second, as organizations become increasingly complex and interde-
pendent, workplaces often house more than just a single organization’s work-
ers; vendors, suppliers, temporary employees, employees of other entities, 
independent contractors, and many others are also regularly present.30 As 
workplace interactions between employees and non-employees increase, so 
too does the risk of non-employee discrimination. 
A. The Service Economy 
Service-sector employees have always been vulnerable to non-
employee discrimination due to their frequent and intimate contact with 
customers and other non-employees.31 Although the service sector was rela-
tively small for much of American history, during the twentieth century “the 
composition of the labor force shifted from industries dominated by primary 
production occupations . . . to those dominated by professional, technical 
and service workers.”32 Between 1900 and 2000, the percentage of the labor 
force that worked on farms declined from 38% to less than 3%, whereas the 
percentage of workers in the service sector more than doubled from 31% to 
78%.33 The U.S. Department of Labor estimated that the service sector ac-
counted for over 80% of all jobs as of 201434 and projected “service-
                                                                                                                           
 28 See Fisk, supra note 15; infra notes 31–46 and accompanying text. 
 29 See Fisk, supra note 15; infra notes 47–70 and accompanying text. 
 30 See, e.g.,Mike Ettling, The Rise of the Contingent: Why You Should Connect with Everyone 
in Your Workforce, SAP (Dec. 17, 2014), https://blogs.sap.com/2014/12/17/the-rise-of-the-
contingent-why-you-should-connect-with-everyone-in-your-workforce/ [https://perma.cc/793V-
ZP5G] (“As we enter 2015, we can’t help but notice that businesses are increasing their dependen-
cy on contingent labour . . . .”). 
 31 See Wang, supra note 9, at 268 (stating that “most of service workers’ regular job-related 
interaction is with customers. Service workers often spend more time with, are in closer physical 
proximity to, and communicate more directly with customers than with managers or co-workers”). 
 32 Fisk, supra note 15. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics of U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Emp’t Projections—
2014–24 (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecopro.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8FC-
3L4V]. 
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providing sectors are projected to capture 94.6 percent of all jobs added be-
tween 2014 and 2024.”35 
Because the vast majority of American jobs are now service based, a 
significant portion of the labor force interfaces with customers, clients, and 
other members of the public on a regular basis.36 As the number of service 
encounters between customers and employees increases, so too does the like-
lihood of employees experiencing non-employee discrimination.37 Moreover, 
the potential for non-employee discrimination in an ever-expanding service 
sector is further bolstered by the fact that women and people of color—
common targets of discrimination—are vastly overrepresented in service 
jobs.38 
The likely rise in non-employee discrimination stems not only from 
increased interactions between employees and non-employees but also the 
growing influence of third parties in employment relationships. In a society 
where customer satisfaction is increasingly considered a top priority,39 cus-
tomers wield tremendous influence over employers—not just in determin-
ing the types of goods and services offered but also in the relationships be-
tween employers and employees. Einat Albin argues that “changes in the 
labour market—such as globalisation, the disintegration of the firm, greater 
flexibility, the decrease of unionization, [and] the rise of service work [] . . . 
have widened the extent of third-party involvement” in the employment 
relationship.40 In a service-based economy, it is increasingly common for 
customers to influence an array of employing functions once reserved al-
most exclusively to employers. This includes which employees get hired, 
fired, and promoted, the assignment of job tasks and responsibilities, and 
even how much money an employee earns through pay raises, tips, and oth-
er discretionary wages.41 The increased influence by third parties has 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Id. at 2. 
 36 See Wang, supra note 9, at 268–69; Fisk, supra note 15. 
 37 See Wang, supra note 9, at 268–69. 
 38 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS 
FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: 2016, TABLE 11 EMPLOYED PERSONS BY DETAILED 
OCCUPATION, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC OR LATINO ETHNICITY, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat
11.pdf [https://perma.cc/25L9-PTPE]. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that women hold 
56.6% of service jobs (compared to 46.8% of all jobs), whereas people of color (Asians, Hispan-
ics, Black or African American) hold 46.2% of service jobs (compared to 34.7% of all jobs). See 
id. at 1, 4. 
 39 See NIGEL HILL ET AL., CUSTOMER SATISFACTION: THE CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE 
THROUGH THE CUSTOMER’S EYES 21–22 (2007) (explaining that “[c]ompanies with higher cus-
tomer satisfaction produce better return[s] for shareholders”); PAUL SZWARC, RESEARCHING 
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION & LOYALTY: HOW TO FIND OUT WHAT PEOPLE REALLY THINK 162–
64 (2005) (same). 
 40 See Albin, supra note 16, at 182. 
 41 See id. at 186–89. 
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prompted Albin and others to suggest recasting the traditional binary em-
ployer-employee relationship as a “service triangle” comprised of the em-
ployer, employee, and customer.42 One scholar notes that “[w]ithin this tri-
angle each party is dependent on each other, but the parties can have con-
flicting or complementary interests.”43 In this sense, third parties become a 
second employer that, in some instances, may become even more important 
than the primary employer to the employee.44 Albin explains that “[o]nce a 
worker is more dependent on a third party for earnings, she becomes less 
loyal to her employer and more biased towards the paying customer.”45 
For employment discrimination purposes, reconfiguring the traditional 
employer-employee relationship as a service triangle is problematic in the 
sense that employment discrimination liability extends only to employers, 
whereas customers face no repercussions under the law for either their direct 
or indirect discriminatory actions against employees. Whether the law can or 
should extend liability for employment discrimination to third parties is an 
important question, which is starting to generate some much needed scholarly 
attention.46 This Article, however, focuses on the extent to which employers 
should be held liable for the discriminatory actions of non-employees in light 
of their growing influence over the terms and conditions of employment. 
B. Growing Organizational Complexity 
For much of history, the American workplace was fairly uncomplicat-
ed, as employees had more interactions with fellow employees than with 
non-employees while at work.47 This was especially true of the manufactur-
                                                                                                                           
 42 See id. at 183–84; Sharon C. Bolton & Maeve Houlihan, Bermuda Revisited? Management 
Power and Powerlessness in the Worker-Manager-Customer Triangle, 37 WORK & OCCUPA-
TIONS 378, 380–84 (2010); Ulla Forseth, Gender Matters? Exploring How Gender Is Negotiated 
in Service Encounters, 12 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 440, 442 (2005); Stephen Henry Lopez, Work-
ers, Managers and Customers: Triangles of Power in Work Communities, 37 WORK & OCCUPA-
TIONS 251, 255 (2010); Wang, supra note 9, at 254–62. 
 43 Forseth, supra note 42, at 442. 
 44 See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Law of Intimate Work, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1167, 1184 (2015). 
 45 Albin, supra note 16, at 184. 
 46 See id. at 184 n.12 (“There are, of course, other examples of the worker–employer–
customer triangle worthy of further investigation. Such are situations of sexual harassment by 
customers; of customers who induce employers to discriminate against workers, etc.”); see also 
Einat Albin, Labour Law in a Service World, 73 MODERN L. REV. 959, 960 (2010) (noting that 
“in today’s Service World the market transaction of labour includes multiple players, the dominant 
ones being workers, employers and customers, and that labour law should be thought of accord-
ingly”); Wang, supra note 9, at 285–92. 
 47 See Fisk, supra note 15 (finding that at the beginning of the twentieth century, most of the 
labor force consisted of “primary production occupations, such as farmers and foresters”). 
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ing sector, which predominated for much of the past century.48 Certainly 
some interactions with non-employees occurred—particularly in the service 
sector—but not nearly as often as they do today.49 Moreover, with perhaps 
the exception of customers occasionally tipping service employees,50 non-
employees played a negligible role in determining the terms and conditions 
of an employee’s employment.51 Because workers typically faced discrimi-
nation from supervisors and coworkers rather than from non-employees, 
antidiscrimination laws that held employers liable for the discriminatory 
actions of persons in their employ arguably were adequate to protect em-
ployees from most workplace discrimination. 
As the economy becomes more complex, the likelihood of employees 
interacting with non-employees in the workplace has drastically increased.52 
Growing organizational complexity is a major reason for this development. 
Along with single-entity employers, there is now a dizzying network of par-
ent companies, subsidiaries, wholly-owned subsidiaries, sister companies, 
associates, affiliates, divisions, branches, franchises, and joint ventures, to 
name just a few. This often results in employees of separate and distinct 
entities simultaneously occupying the same workspace, such that an em-
ployee’s “coworkers” may in fact be employed by a different employer al-
together.53 Consequently, whereas in the past customers were likely the 
most common, if not exclusive, perpetrators of non-employee discrimina-
tion, today it may be the case that much of the non-employee discrimination 
that employees experience stems from “coworkers” who are actually em-
ployed by other entities. For example, in Torres-Negrón v. Merck & Co., 
Inc., Kathleen Torres worked as a sales representative for Merck-Puerto 
Rico (“Merck PR”).54 Torres claimed her colleagues at fellow subsidiary 
Merck-Mexico made negative and harassing comments about her gender, 
citizenship, salary, and Puerto Rican accent while she was temporarily as-
signed to that location.55 The First Circuit held that Merck-PR could be lia-
                                                                                                                           
 48 See id. 
 49 See id. 
 50 It is believed that tipping in the United States began in the late nineteenth century following 
the American Civil War, when wealthy Americans traveling abroad to Europe witnessed tipping 
and brought the aristocratic custom back with them to flaunt their elevated social status. See Paul 
Wachter, Why Tip?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/
magazine/12tipping-t.html [https://perma.cc/9NEU-TCXL]. 
 51 See Albin, supra note 16, at 186–89 (explaining that as the economy becomes more con-
sumer driven, customers are increasingly taking part in employing functions once reserved almost 
exclusively to employers). 
 52 See Fisk, supra note 15. 
 53 See, e.g., Torres-Negrón v. Merck & Co., 488 F.3d 34, 40–43 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 54 See id. at 36. 
 55 Id. at 36–37.  
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ble for the Merck-Mexico employees’ harassment because the two subsidi-
aries constituted a single employer under an integrated-enterprise test.56 
Even where the relationship between two entities is not as close, an em-
ployer may still be liable for non-employee discrimination. This was the 
case when two non-employee physicians sexually harassed a hospital em-
ployee in the operating room,57 and in another instance, when a county dep-
uty harassed a city police officer because of his Polish heritage while serv-
ing together on a community drug taskforce.58 
The question of who employs whom is further complicated by the pro-
liferation of professional employer organizations, employee management 
companies, temporary employment and staffing agencies, joint-employment 
agreements, and work-sharing arrangements. Thus, it is entirely possible for 
one company to employ a supervisor, while another company employs her 
subordinates. This was the case in Neal v. Manpower International, Inc., 
where Manpower, a temporary staffing agency, hired Shneirdre Neal to 
work as a production worker at a client’s garage door manufacturing facili-
ty.59 During this assignment, Neal’s supervisor, who was employed by the 
client rather than Manpower, made a series of sexually suggestive com-
ments to Neal.60 The court concluded that even though the supervisor was 
not a Manpower employee, Manpower still could be held liable for the har-
assment.61 
Greater employee-non-employee interaction in the workplace is also 
attributable to growth in outsourcing.62 As businesses become more special-
ized, they also become more interdependent.63 In the modern economy, 
manufacturers outsource between seventy and eighty percent of the content 
of their finished products.64 Larger companies commonly outsource every-
thing from IT support to back office operations such as human resources, 
payroll, and accounting.65 In fact, one economist predicts that “before too 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Id. at 40–43. 
 57 See Santos v. P.R. Children’s Hosp., No. 11-1539, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140731, at *2–4, 
*6–13 (D.P.R. Sept. 28, 2012). 
 58 Zasada v. City of Englewood, No. 11-cv-02834-MSK-MJW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
45550, at *4, *12 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2013). 
 59 No. 3:00-cv-277/LAC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25805, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2001). 
 60 Id. at *8–11. 
 61 Id. at *28–36. 
 62 See MICHAEL F. CORBETT, THE OUTSOURCING REVOLUTION, at xiii (2004). 
 63 See Dorie Clark, Dan Ariely on Why We’re All a Little Dishonest—and What to Do About 
It, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2013, 10:00 A.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dorieclark/2013/10/29/dan-
ariely-on-why-were-all-a-little-dishonest-and-what-to-do-about-it/#55ccbc046579 [https://perma.
cc/3U7J-3G9H]. 
 64 See Corbett, supra note 62, at xiii. 
 65 See id. 
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long most organizations are going to be far more outsourced than they are 
‘in-sourced,’” signifying a “fundamental restructuring of organizations that 
carries enormous implications for all of us—executives, managers, employ-
ees, customers, and investors alike.”66 As a result of outsourcing, there may 
be greater interaction between employees and vendors, contractors, and 
suppliers. For example, in Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., Delta employed 
Elise Berry as a customer service agent in its cargo facilities at Chicago 
O’Hare International Airport.67 Delta outsourced its baggage handling ser-
vices to a separate company, whose employees worked in the warehouse 
portion of Delta’s cargo facilities.68 Berry, who sometimes had to enter the 
warehouse as part of her job, sued Delta after one of the outsourced em-
ployees inappropriately touched her and made sexual advances toward 
her.69 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged Delta could be liable for the non-
employee’s harassment but ultimately affirmed dismissal of Berry’s claims 
on other grounds.70 
In sum, non-employee discrimination will likely become even more 
prevalent as interactions between employees and non-employees increase due 
to the continued growth of the service sector, as well as the rise of multiem-
ployer workplaces resulting from increasing organizational complexity and 
interdependence. Along with these increased interactions, non-employees are 
wielding greater influence over employment decisions, thereby generating 
even more opportunities for discrimination. 
II. MANIFESTATIONS OF NON-EMPLOYEE DISCRIMINATION 
When people envision non-employee discrimination, the scenario that 
perhaps most typically comes to mind is one in which a male customer sex-
ually harasses a female employee. This type of non-employee discrimination 
is relatively straightforward because the discrimination is both conscious (i.e., 
the customer intends to harass the employee) and direct (i.e., the customer is 
the immediate source of the harassment). But not all non-employee discrimi-
nation is conscious and direct. Sometimes it is conscious but indirect, where-
as other times the discrimination is altogether unconscious and may be either 
direct or indirect. Distinguishing between conscious versus unconscious, and 
direct versus indirect non-employee discrimination helps underscore the need 
for an employer liability standard that adequately accounts for the fact that 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See id. at xiv. 
 67 260 F.3d 803, 804 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 804–05. 
 70 See id. at 811–12, 814. 
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some forms of non-employee discrimination are easier than others for em-
ployers to prevent, detect, and remedy. 
A. Conscious Discrimination 
Virtually all reported judicial opinions concerning non-employee dis-
crimination involve conscious, intentional discrimination. While this may 
be the most common type of non-employee discrimination, it may could 
also be the case that this type of discrimination is frequently litigated be-
cause it is relatively easy to detect. Conscious non-employee discrimination 
can be either direct or indirect. The discrimination is direct if the non-
employee herself takes an adverse action against the employee, whereas it is 
indirect if the non-employee makes a discriminatory request or expresses a 
discriminatory preference to an employer, who then takes the adverse action 
against an employee to appease the non-employee.71 
1. Direct Discrimination 
Direct, conscious discrimination occurs when a non-employee directly 
causes an employee to suffer an adverse employment action or, in the case 
of harassment, “alter[s] the conditions of the victim’s employment and [] 
create[s] an abusive working environment.”72 It is fairly difficult for a non-
employee to directly cause an employee to suffer an adverse employment 
action because non-employees cannot independently hire, fire, promote, or 
otherwise directly determine an employee’s working conditions.73 However, 
one notable exception is compensation, because in some cases customers 
can directly impact employees’ earnings through their provision of tips.74 
Although it is conceivable that some customers might consciously tip an 
employee less because of the employee’s race, sex, or other protected char-
acteristic, research suggests discriminatory tipping is largely an unconscious 
phenomenon.75 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See infra notes 72–99 and accompanying text (discussing direct and indirect discrimina-
tion). 
 72 Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
 73 See U.S. EEOC, Facts About Retaliation, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/facts-retal.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/5KPK-CD75]. 
 74 See Albin, supra note 16, at 184 (“Tips constitute an interesting case of a paying structure 
that directly impacts the precariousness of workers because it enhances the involvement of cus-
tomers in that relationship.”). 
 75 See Ian Ayres et al., To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 YALE 
L.J. 1613, 1653–54 (2005) (suggesting that both conscious and unconscious motivations play a 
role in whites and blacks tipping black taxicab drivers less than white drivers); Michael Lynn et 
al., Consumer Racial Discrimination in Tipping: A Replication and Extension, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. 
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Perhaps the most likely scenario in which a non-employee directly and 
consciously discriminates against an employee is through the creation of a 
hostile work environment. For example, in EEOC v. GNLV Corp., the 
EEOC brought suit on behalf of Susie Fein, a blackjack dealer at the Golden 
Nugget in Las Vegas, Nevada.76 Fein alleged that during her employment 
three patrons sexually harassed her by repeatedly calling her vulgar names, 
throwing their cards at her, touching her hair, kissing her on the lips, and 
slapping her hands.77 Similarly, in Galdamez v. Potter, Arlene Galdamez 
filed a national origin discrimination lawsuit against her employer, the U.S. 
Postal Service, after she allegedly “endured offensive verbal comments 
from customers and community members, references in local newspapers to 
her accent and foreign birth, direct and indirect threats to her safety, and 
vandalism to her car” after she took over as postmaster and enacted several 
changes to bring the post office where she worked in line with Postal Ser-
vice regulations.78 In cases of non-employee harassment, courts hold em-
ployers liable if they knew or should have known about the harassment and 
failed to take reasonable steps to remedy it.79 
2. Indirect Discrimination 
Indirect, conscious discrimination occurs when a non-employee makes 
a discriminatory request or states a discriminatory preference to an employ-
er, and the employer thereafter takes adverse action to comply with the cus-
tomer’s request or preference.80 Such discrimination is more conceptually 
challenging than direct, conscious discrimination because neither the non-
employee nor the employer is entirely at fault: The non-employee possesses 
discriminatory intent but does not take the adverse employment action and 
the employer commits the adverse employment action but may lack dis-
criminatory intent. 
In today’s fiercely competitive business environment, there is little 
doubt the customer is king. Research shows that highly satisfied customers 
                                                                                                                           
PSYCHOL. 1045, 1055–56 (2008) (concluding that implicit racial bias was the most “plausible 
explanation” for findings that both blacks and whites tipped black servers less than white servers). 
 76 No. 2:06-cv-01225-RCJ-PAL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177439, at *3, *8 (D. Nev. Dec. 18, 
2014). 
 77 Id. at *8–10. 
 78 See 415 F.3d 1015, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 79 See infra notes 138–200 and accompanying text (analyzing judicial treatment of harassment 
by non-employees). 
 80 See, e.g., Williams v. G4S Secure Sol. (USA), Inc., No. ELH-10-3476, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 66249, at *4–6 (D. Md. May 11, 2012). 
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are more likely to purchase again,81 to spread positive word of mouth,82 and 
to accept price increases.83 Increasing customer satisfaction also leads to 
greater revenues84 and lower marketing costs.85 Thus, it is hardly surprising 
that many businesses proclaim customer satisfaction to be their top priori-
ty,86 such that they will do almost anything to satisfy, and hopefully retain, 
customers.87 This includes catering to a host of customer preferences—
stated or implied. 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See Fatma Demirci Orel & Ali Kara, Supermarket Self-Checkout Service Quality, Customer 
Satisfaction, and Loyalty: Empirical Evidence from an Emerging Market, 21 J. RETAILING & 
CONSUMER SERVS. 118, 128–29 (2014) (service quality positively influences loyalty through the 
customer service path); David M. Syzmanski & David H. Henard, Customer Satisfaction: A Meta-
analysis of the Empirical Evidence, 29 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 16, 19 (2001). 
 82 See generally Eugene W. Anderson, Customer Satisfaction and Word of Mouth, 1 J. SER-
VICE RES. 1 (1998) (dissatisfied customers engage in greater word of mouth than satisfied ones); 
James G. Maxham III, Service Recovery’s Influence on Consumer Satisfaction, Positive Word-of-
Mouth, and Purchase Intentions, 54 J. BUS. RES. 11 (2001) (moderate to high service recovery 
efforts significantly increase post-failure levels of satisfaction, purchase intent, and positive word-
of-mouth). 
 83 See generally Eugene W. Anderson, Customer Satisfaction and Price Tolerance, 7 MAR-
KETING LETTERS 19 (1996) (finding a negative association between the level of customer satisfac-
tion and the degree of price tolerance exhibited by customers); Christian Homburg et al., Custom-
ers’ Reactions to Price Increases: Do Customer Satisfaction and Perceived Motive Fairness Mat-
ter?, 33 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 36 (2005) (as customer satisfaction increases, the negative 
impact of the magnitude of a price increase weakens); Frank Huber et al., Customer Satisfaction 
as an Antecedent of Price Acceptance: Results of an Empirical Study, 10 J. PRODUCT & BRAND 
MGMT. 160 (2001) (finding a positive correlation between customer satisfaction and price ac-
ceptance). 
 84 See Thomas S. Gruca & Lopo L. Rego, Customer Satisfaction, Cash Flow, and Sharehold-
er Value, 69 J. MARKETING 115, 115 (2005) (noting that “[customer] satisfaction creates share-
holder value by increasing future cash flow growth and reducing its variability”). 
 85 Frederick F. Reichheld & W. Earl Sasser, Jr., Zero Defections: Quality Comes to Services, 
HARVARD BUS. REV., Sep.–Oct. 1990, https://hbr.org/1990/09/zero-defections-quality-comes-to-
services [https://perma.cc/TD5D-FZEP] (“As purchases rise, operating costs decline. . . . Also, as 
the company gains experience with its customers, it can serve them more efficiently.”). 
 86 See, e.g., BRAD STONE, THE EVERYTHING STORE: JEFF BEZOS AND THE AGE OF AMAZON 
111 (2013) (describing Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos as obsessed with delivering a flawless customer 
experience); AUTOMOTIVE SOL., http://www.autorepairwhitehousetn.com/ [https://perma.cc/
73GX-EBA4]) (“Your Satisfaction is Our Highest Priority!”); Contact Us, MOELLER MANUF. & 
SUPPLY, INC., http://www.moellermfg.com/contact [https://perma.cc/9LRG-SPH4] (“Your satis-
faction is our top priority and we’ll endeavor to maintain our status of 100% customer satisfac-
tion.”). 
 87 See, e.g., Tim Stelloh, United CEO: Doctor Being Dragged Off Plane Was ‘Watershed Mo-
ment,’ NBC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2017, 8:20 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/travel/united-ceo-
doctor-being-dragged-plane-was-watershed-moment-n747586 [https://perma.cc/B4V3-S5NK]. In 
response to public outcry over forcibly removing a passenger from an overbooked flight, United 
Airlines CEO Oscar Munoz vowed, “We are more determined than ever to put our customers at the 
center of everything we do. We are dedicated to setting the standard for customer service among U.S. 
airlines.” Id. 
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The employer’s drive to please empowers customers to indirectly in-
fluence employment decisions through making discriminatory requests or 
stating discriminatory preferences to employers.88 Customer requests and 
preferences can impact who an employer hires, promotes, and fires; job as-
signments; remuneration; and other terms and conditions of employment.89 
For example, in Williams v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA), Inc., Rita Wil-
liams brought a sex discrimination suit against her former employer, a staff-
ing company that provides security personnel to clients, after it removed her 
from a highly favorable assignment with a medical center because the client 
insisted on having only male security guards.90 Similarly, in Chaney v. 
Plainfield Healthcare Center, Brenda Williams, a nurse aide, sued her em-
ployer for race discrimination after it prohibited her from treating certain 
nursing home residents who had requested not to be treated by black work-
ers.91 
Even when customers do not articulate an explicitly discriminatory re-
quest or preference, employers can often make inferences based on purchas-
ing patterns, survey data, or anecdotal evidence. These inferences can moti-
vate employers to take discriminatory actions in an effort to give customers 
what employers think they want. For example, in Johnson v. Maestri-Murrell 
Property Management, LLC, Kimberly Johnson sued her prospective em-
ployer for failing to hire her because of her race.92 Johnson alleged she was 
not considered for an assistant manager position at an apartment complex that 
primarily housed white Louisiana State University students because man-
agement assumed the students’ parents would object to having a black assis-
tant manager.93 Similarly, in Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc., a pizza de-
livery driver alleged Domino’s discriminated against him because of his race 
by refusing to allow him to grow a beard.94 Bradley claimed he suffered from 
pseudofolliculitis barbae (“PFB”), a skin condition affecting approximately 
half of African-American males, many of whom cannot shave at all.95 He 
further alleged that the no-beard policy unfairly discriminated against him 
and other African-American males suffering from PFB.96 Although no cus-
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Dallan F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring Biased Customer 
Feedback into Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 
19–21) (on file with author). 
 89 See id. 
 90 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140368, at *4–5. 
 91 See 612 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 92 487 F. App’x 134, 134 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 93 Id. at 134–35. 
 94 See 7 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 95 Id.  
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tomers had explicitly told Domino’s that bearded employees made them un-
comfortable, Domino’s maintained a strict no-beard policy based on the re-
sults of a public opinion survey it commissioned that showed up to twenty 
percent of respondents would react negatively to a bearded delivery man.97 In 
Silver v. North Shore University Hospital, a fifty-nine-year-old research scien-
tist brought an age discrimination claim after his employer fired him because 
it feared various foundations would no longer give him research grants be-
cause of his age.98 Like in non-employee harassment cases, the courts tend to 
have little sympathy for employers who cater to discriminatory customer 
preferences—explicit or implied.99 
B. Unconscious Discrimination 
Although instances of conscious discrimination continue to occur far 
too often, researchers have found that overt discrimination may be declining 
as antidiscrimination norms become more deeply entrenched in American 
society.100 Whether this trend continues under the Trump administration is 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Id. at 798. 
 98 490 F. Supp. 2d 354, 356–58 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 99 See infra notes 135–274 and accompanying text (analyzing judicial treatment of discrimi-
natory preferences and requests by non-employees). 
 100 See, e.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, in ADVANCES IN EX-
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Care Outcomes: A Systematic Review, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e60, e61 (2015) (“Although overt 
discriminatory behavior in the United States may have declined in recent decades, covert discrim-
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behavior and treatment choices.”); Kristen P. Jones et al., Not So Subtle: A Meta-Analytic Investi-
gation of the Correlates of Subtle and Overt Discrimination, 42 J. MGMT. 1588, 1589 (2016) 
(finding that workplace discrimination is becoming less overt and more subtle); Dana E. Mastro et 
al., Exposure to Television Portrayals of Latinos: The Implications of Aversive Racism and Social 
Identity Theory, 34 HUMAN COMM’N RES. 1, 19–20 (2008); Yolanda Flores Niemann & Nydia C. 
Sanchez, Perceptions About the Role of Race in the Job Acquisition Process: At the Nexus of At-
tributional Ambiguity and Aversive Racism in Technology and Engineering Education, J. TECH. 
EDUC., Fall 2015, at 46–50; Adam R. Pearson et al., The Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: 
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yet to be determined.101 Samuel L. Gaertner and John F. Dovidio argue that 
as certain types of discrimination become less socially acceptable, many 
people “consciously, explicitly, and sincerely support egalitarian principles 
and believe themselves to be nonprejudiced” while simultaneously uncon-
sciously “harbor[ing] negative feelings and beliefs about . . . historically 
disadvantaged groups.”102 They further contend that “[people] consciously 
recognize and endorse egalitarian values, and because they truly aspire to be 
nonprejudiced, they will not discriminate in situations with strong social 
norms when discrimination would be obvious to others and to them-
selves.”103 Instead, “these feelings will eventually be expressed, but in sub-
tle, indirect, and rationalizable ways,” such as “in situations in which nor-
mative structure is weak, when the guidelines for appropriate behavior are 
vague, or when the basis for social judgment is ambiguous.”104 This new 
form of discrimination, which they dub “aversive racism,”105 is a wide-
spread phenomenon found in people of all ages,106 races,107 and education 
levels.108 Because aversive discrimination manifests itself through extreme-
                                                                                                                           
Insights from Aversive Racism, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 314, 321 (2009) 
(“[I]n contrast to the dramatic decline in overt expressions of prejudice, subtle forms of discrimi-
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ly subtle, and often unintentional, discriminatory acts, it is often difficult for 
skilled social scientists, much less employers, to detect.109 
Employees are not immune from experiencing unconscious discrimi-
nation from customers and other non-employees. As with conscious dis-
crimination, this unconscious discrimination can be both direct and indirect. 
1. Direct Discrimination 
A common manifestation of direct, unconscious discrimination is dis-
played within tipping behavior. Two key studies illustrate how customers’ 
unconscious biases can lead them to tip employees of color less than white 
employees. One study analyzing more than one thousand tips to taxi cab 
drivers in New Haven, Connecticut, revealed that black cab drivers on aver-
age “were tipped approximately one-third less than white cab driv-
ers . . . .”110 Black cab drivers were also eighty percent more likely than 
white drivers to receive no tip at all.111 Although these findings are im-
portant in and of themselves, perhaps more remarkable is the fact that black 
passengers also discriminated against black drivers, on average tipping 
black drivers approximately one-third less than they tipped white drivers.112 
The researchers attributed their findings to both conscious and unconscious 
racism, speculating that a passenger’s decision to leave no tip at all was 
consciously motivated, whereas deciding how much to tip was unconscious-
ly motivated.113 
Building off the taxi driver tipping study, a second study examined the 
effects of server race on restaurant customers’ tipping practices.114 Analysis 
of data from 140 diners revealed that both white and black diners tipped 
black servers less than white servers, even after statistically controlling for 
customers’ rating of service (which the taxi driver tipping study was unable 
                                                                                                                           
racial-bias-among-biracial-and-single-race-adults-the-iat/ [https://perma.cc/W2CS-GDWL] (find-
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 109 See John F. Dovidio et al., Why Can’t We Just Get Along? Interpersonal Biases and Inter-
racial Distrust, 8 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 88, 90 (2002) (finding 
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 113 Id. at 1653–55. The authors cautioned, however, that they were “pushing the data to the 
limits of their competence” in reaching this conclusion. Id. at 1655. 
 114 See Lynn, supra note 75, at 1046. 
2017] Non-employee Discrimination  1189 
to test).115 Because the restaurant tipping study did not administer an im-
plicit association test to the customers, they could not prove with certainty 
that implicit attitudes mediated the effects of server race on tipping but nev-
ertheless concluded it was “the most plausible explanation for [their] find-
ings, and it is consistent with what we know about implicit racial attitudes 
in the general population.”116 These findings led the authors of the study to 
question the legality of tipping, pointing out that in instances where tipping 
has an unintended disparate impact on employees of different races, em-
ployers could be held liable under Title VII absent proof that the tipping 
policy was job related and consistent with business necessity.117 
2. Indirect Discrimination 
Outside the tipping context, most unconscious discrimination by non-
employees is likely to be indirect—typically manifesting itself when cus-
tomers provide unintentionally biased feedback to employers via satisfac-
tion surveys, complaints, and other reporting mechanisms.118 Although the 
concept of customer satisfaction dates back centuries,119 surveying and 
measuring customer satisfaction is a relatively recent phenomenon resulting 
from total quality management theories positing that product quality is best 
measured through external metrics like customer satisfaction rather than 
internal metrics such as compliance with engineering and design specifica-
tions.120 Whereas customer satisfaction research once was primarily limited 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id. at 1051, 1055. 
 116 See id. at 1055. 
 117 Id. at 1057–58. In a disparate impact case, the employer is liable for facially neutral em-
ployment practices and policies that disparately impact a protected group unless the employer is 
able to show the policy is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 118 See Flake, supra note 88, at 18. 
 119 See, e.g., Shep Hyken, Oldest Customer Service Complaint Discovered: A Lesson from 
Ancient Babylon, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2015, 12:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/shephyken/
2015/04/23/oldest-customer-service-complaint-discovered-a-lesson-from-ancient-babylon/#43bf2
3945a06 [https://perma.cc/ZR95-CYSW] (discussing a letter dated 1750 BC from an unsatisfied 
copper ore customer to his supplier in which the customer implies he dispatched his personal as-
sistants to the supplier “at least once looking for a refund, only to be rebuffed and sent home emp-
ty handed”). 
 120 See Gilbert A. Churchill, Jr. & Carol Surprenant, An Investigation Into the Determinants of 
Customer Satisfaction, 19 J. MKT. RES. 491, 491 (1982); (“In the early 1970s, consumer satisfac-
tion began to emerge as a legitimate field of inquiry.”). See generally Thomas C. Powell, Total 
Quality Management as Competitive Advantage: A Review and Empirical Study, 16 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J. 15 (1995) (discussing which features of total quality management provide advantages); 
Barbara A. Spencer, Models of Organization and Total Quality Management: A Comparison and 
Critical Evaluation, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 446 (1994) (suggesting that understanding certain 
management models can be furthered by total quality management research). 
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to telephone calls, in-person interviews and focus groups, and paper sur-
veys, the advent of the internet and new social media tools have made solic-
iting customer feedback easier, faster, and less expensive than ever.121 To-
day, consumers are bombarded seemingly at every turn with feedback re-
quests, and businesses often provide incentives—from free desserts122 to 
gift cards123—to those who participate. 
As critical as customer feedback has become, it may be deeply prob-
lematic for antidiscrimination purposes for at least two reasons. First, it is 
well established that customers discriminate in their evaluation of service 
workers. For instance, one study found that restaurant customers not only 
tipped white servers more than black servers but also rated servers of their 
same race higher than servers of other races on situational dimensions of 
performance such as attentiveness and promptness.124 Importantly, the au-
thors concluded that much of the bias resulted from aversive rather than 
overt racism.125 A tripartite study of consumer discrimination revealed simi-
lar evaluational biases: medical patients evaluated female and nonwhite 
physicians less favorably than white male physicians, students observing a 
video of an employee-customer interaction rated female and black employ-
ees lower than white male employees, and country club members reported 
higher satisfaction levels at clubs with low percentages of female and 
nonwhite employees.126 Likewise, another study found that post-secondary 
students evaluated their male instructors more favorably than their female 
instructors.127 These studies make clear that when consumers consciously 
or, more likely, unconsciously allow biases to affect their evaluation of a 
                                                                                                                           
 121 See Ray Poynter, The Rise of Customer Satisfaction Research, VISIONCRITICAL (Nov. 6, 
2013), https://www.visioncritical.com/rise-customer-satisfaction-research/ [https://perma.cc/45Y8-
Y89H].  
 122 See, e.g., List of Fast Food Receipts That Give Free Food with Survey, SLICKDEALS, 
http://slickdeals.net/f/2180785-list-of-fast-food-receipts-that-give-free-food-with-survey-ymmv 
[https://perma.cc/AJ6Q-ETS5] (compiling a list of fast food restaurants offering free desserts and 
appetizers to customers who take a survey). 
 123 See, e.g., The Best Online Surveys for Amazon Gift Cards, SURVEY CHRIS, http://survey
chris.com/best-online-surveys-amazon-gift-cards/ [https://perma.cc/94U6-EC4X] (compiling list of 
websites where consumers can take surveys in exchange for Amazon gift cards). 
 124 Michael Lynn & Michael C. Sturman, Is the Customer Always Right? The Potential for 
Racial Bias in Customer Evaluations of Employee Performance, 41 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 
2312, 2317–18 (2011). 
 125 Id. at 2321 (“In summary, this study found that restaurant patrons rated the performance of 
same-race servers higher than that of different-race servers, at least on more situational dimen-
sions of service. This finding provides support for the basic tenets of aversive racism theory.”). 
 126 David R. Hekman et al., An Examination of Whether and How Racial and Gender Biases 
Influence Customer Satisfaction, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 238, 246–57 (2010). 
 127 Robin L. Snipes et al., Gender Bias in Customer Evaluations of Service Quality: An Em-
pirical Investigation, 20 J. SERVS. MARKETING 274, 280–81 (2006). 
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service encounter, the feedback becomes compromised because it does not 
accurately reflect reality. 
The second reason customer feedback may be problematic is because 
employers may use data tainted by customer bias to determine the terms and 
conditions of employment.128 Customer evaluations can influence compen-
sation, including bonuses and raises.129 They can also affect working condi-
tions, such as what shift an employee works or how much contact the em-
ployee has with customers.130 Employers may also consider customer feed-
back in making hiring, firing, and promotion decisions.131 When discrimina-
tory customer feedback factors into employment decisions, the employment 
decisions themselves become unintentionally discriminatory.132 For exam-
ple, if customers unconsciously rate a female customer service representa-
tive lower because of her sex, and her employer decides not to give the em-
ployee a promotion because of her poor ratings, the employee’s sex moti-
vated (albeit unknowingly) the employment decision—an unequivocal vio-
lation of Title VII.133 
Identifying discriminatory customer feedback can prove daunting for 
employers. As racism, sexism, ageism, xenophobia, and other forms of dis-
crimination become less overt and more aversive, it is increasingly difficult 
for employers to detect customer feedback tainted by bias.134 Although cer-
tainly not unheard of, it seems unlikely that a customer would expressly 
state to an employer that he was dissatisfied with an employee because she 
was Muslim—particularly if the feedback is presented in person or other-
wise non-anonymously. More probable, the customer considers himself per-
fectly accepting of Muslims but nonetheless allows his unconscious biases 
to taint his perception of the employee. Absent any explicitly anti-Muslim 
comment in the feedback, it would be nearly impossible for an employer to 
detect this bias. A related problem is that customer feedback may include 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See Flake, supra note 88, at 29–30; Linda Fuller & Vicki Smith, Consumers’ Reports: 
Management by Customers in a Changing Economy, 5 WORK, EMP. & SOC. 1, 5–8 (1991) (a qual-
itative study of fifteen firms finding that each firm utilized customer feedback mechanisms and 
that such feedback “was funneled into employees’ personnel files and often used in bureaucratic 
systems of evaluation and discipline”). 
 129 See Wang, supra note 9, at 280. 
 130 See id. at 250 (noting that “customers play a powerful role in determining the terms, condi-
tions, and privileges of employment”). 
 131 See id. at 279–80. 
 132 See Flake, supra note 88, at 34–36 (discussing unintentional and unknown bias in custom-
er feedback). 
 133 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 134 See Deitch, supra note 100, at 1301 (noting that “subtle, everyday discrimination may 
become even more common, as blatant racism becomes less prevalent among dominant group 
members”). 
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ostensibly nondiscriminatory observations that neither the customer nor the 
employer realizes might be unconscious proxies for discrimination. For in-
stance, a museum patron may leave feedback that an older tour guide 
“lacked energy,” a gym member might complain that her Asian trainer is 
“not athletic enough,” or a homebuyer might report that he wished his Lati-
na agent had been “more articulate.” Although none of these comments is 
facially discriminatory, each could conceivably reflect a customer’s biases. 
In sum, non-employees discriminate against employees in a variety of 
ways, whether consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly. When dis-
crimination tended to be more overt, it was generally easier for employers to 
detect and, consequently, remedy. However, as discrimination becomes more 
subtle, unintentional, and unconscious, it is worth considering whether hold-
ing employers liable for non-employee discrimination continues to make 
sense. The remainder of this Article focuses on the extent to which courts cur-
rently hold employers liable for non-employee discrimination and whether 
this approach can be improved going forward. 
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF NON-EMPLOYEE DISCRIMINATION 
Although the courts have been addressing non-employee discrimina-
tion for more than thirty-five years,135 the types of cases they have heard are 
surprisingly limited. In fact, there are just two categories of non-employee 
discrimination cases, both of which involve conscious, relatively easy-to-
spot discrimination: harassment and discriminatory preferences. Section A 
of this Part analyzes the key non-employee harassment cases,136 whereas 
Section B addresses the most important discriminatory preference deci-
sions.137 Although neither line of cases addresses non-employee discrimina-
tion that is unconscious, they nonetheless provide important insights regard-
ing the employer-employee-non-employee relationship that help lay the 
foundation for the legal framework proposed in Part IV. 
A. Harassment by Non-employees 
Non-employee harassment is the most common type of non-employee 
discrimination before the courts. Although many of the cases involve alle-
                                                                                                                           
 135 The first case to substantively address employer liability for non-employee harassment 
appears to be Marentette v. Mich. Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909, 911–12 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (hold-
ing that the restaurant-employer could be liable for customers harassing its waitresses because it 
required the waitresses to wear provocative uniforms). 
 136 See infra notes 138–201 and accompanying text. 
 137 See infra notes 202–274 and accompanying text. 
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gations of sexual harassment,138 non-employees also have been accused of 
harassing employees because of race,139 religion,140 and national origin.141 
Each federal circuit to consider employer liability for non-employee har-
assment has reached the same general conclusion: The same analytical 
framework that applies to coworker harassment also applies to non-
employee harassment.142 Under this framework, a plaintiff must prove: (1) 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See, e.g., Beckford v. Dep’t of Corr., 605 F.3d 951, 957–58, 962 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that prison could be liable for failing to remedy a sexually hostile work environment created by its 
inmates); EEOC v. GNLV Corp., No. 2:06-cv-01225-RCJ-PAL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177439, 
at *9–11 (D. Nev. Dec. 18, 2014) (denying summary judgment for employer whose employee, a 
cards dealer, alleged customers at her table repeatedly called her a “f***ing bitch,” and one cus-
tomer kissed her on the lips approximately twenty times); Santos v. P.R. Children’s Hosp., No. 
11-1539, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140731, at *2–4, *6–13 (D.P.R. Sept. 28, 2012) (denying motion 
to dismiss where plaintiff, a hospital employee, claimed two non-employee physicians made un-
wanted sexual advances toward her and rubbed their genitalia against her). 
 139 See, e.g., Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 750 F.3d 413, 426 (4th Cir. 2014) (reversing sum-
mary judgment for employer based on allegations that an independent sales representative repeat-
edly made racially disparaging remarks to the plaintiff); Muldrow v. Schmidt Baking Co., No. 
WDQ-11-0519, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144783, at *48–50 (D. Md. Oct. 5, 2012) (granting sum-
mary judgment to employer on claim that the plaintiff, a delivery driver, was racially harassed by 
a store manager on one of his routes because the employer immediately addressed the plaintiff’s 
complaint upon learning of the allegations). 
 140 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Elite Care Mgmt., No. 12 C 6245, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169159, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2012) (illustrating a home health care associate suing an employer based on 
allegations that a client subjected them to slurs about their religion). 
 141 See, e.g., Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1022–25 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing denial of 
motion for new trial because the district court erroneously held that the employer could not be 
liable for non-employee harassment where the plaintiff, a postmaster, alleged customers made 
death threats toward her based on her Honduran ancestry); Zasada v. City of Englewood, No. 11-
cv-02834-MSK-MJW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45550, at *5–6, *12–13 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2013) 
(denying motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim that while serving on a drug taskforce, a fellow 
undercover officer employed by a different municipality made demeaning comments to him about 
his Polish heritage). 
 142 See Freeman, 750 F.3d at 423 (“[A]n employer is liable under Title VII for third parties 
creating a hostile work environment if the employer knew or should have known of the harass-
ment and failed to ‘take prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment’”) 
(quoting Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1131 (4th Cir. 1995)); Medina-
Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 137 (1st Cir. 2013) (“Because . . . employers must provide 
their personnel with a harassment-free workplace, they may be on the hook for a nonemployee’s 
sexually-harassing behavior under certain conditions—one of which being that they knew or 
should have known about the harassment and yet failed to take prompt steps to stop it.”); Summa 
v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e now adopt the well-reasoned rules of 
the [EEOC] in imputing employer liability for harassment by non-employees according to the 
same standards for non-supervisory co-workers”); Erickson v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 469 F.3d 600, 
605 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[F]or purposes of Title VII hostile work environment liability based on neg-
ligence, whether the potential harasser is an employee, independent contractor, or even a customer 
is irrelevant”); Galdamez, 415 F.3d at 1022 (2005) (“An employer may be held liable for the ac-
tionable third-party harassment of its employees where it ratifies or condones the conduct by fail-
ing to investigate and remedy it after learning of it.”); Frank v. Harris Cnty., 118 F. App’x 799, 
803 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[E]mployers may be liable under Title VII for the conduct of non-employees 
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membership in a protected class, (2) subjection to unwelcome harassment, 
(3) the harassment was based on the protected characteristic, and (4) the 
harassment was so serious as to affect a term, condition, or privilege of em-
ployment.143 Even if the plaintiff establishes these elements, the employer 
will only be liable if it was negligent: that is, whether it knew or should 
have known about the harassment and failed to take prompt action reasona-
bly calculated to end the harassment.144 
The courts’ rationale for holding employers to the same standard for 
non-employee harassment as coworker harassment warrants scrutiny in 
light of the reality that employers do not have the same agency relationship 
with non-employees as they do with employees.145 Perhaps the best, and 
certainly most vivid, explanation comes from Judge Easterbrook in Dunn v. 
Washington County Hospital, a case involving allegations that an independ-
ent contractor physician sexually harassed a hospital nurse.146 The district 
court granted the hospital summary judgment based on its determination 
that the hospital could not control the alleged harasser because he was a 
non-employee.147 In reversing the lower court, Judge Easterbrook explained 
that the district court erred in proceeding “as if this were a tort suit” in 
which the hospital could not be liable under principles of respondeat supe-
                                                                                                                           
in the workplace when the employer knows of the harassment but fails to act.”); Watson v. Blue 
Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003) (“When . . . the alleged harassment is commit-
ted by co-workers or customers, a Title VII plaintiff must show that the employer either knew 
(actual notice) or should have known (constructive notice) of the harassment and failed to take 
immediate and appropriate corrective action.”); Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238, 
1244 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[A]n employer may be responsible for sexual harassment based upon the 
acts of nonemployees” under a “negligence analysis.”); Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 
427 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Prison liability for inmate conduct may indeed apply when, for example, the 
institution fails to take appropriate steps to remedy or prevent illegal inmate behavior.”), abrogat-
ed by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Slayton v. Ohio Dep’t of 
Youth Servs., 206 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]his general rule against prison liability for 
inmate conduct does not apply when the institution fails to take appropriate steps to remedy or 
prevent illegal inmate behavior.”); Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 
1997) (applying coworker harassment standard to case involving claim that a developmentally 
disabled resident of a group home sexually harassed employees). 
 143 See, e.g., Wierengo v. Akal Sec., Inc., 580 F. App’x 364, 371 (6th Cir. 2014); EEOC v. 
Boh Bros. Constr. Co., L.L.C., 731 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 144 See, e.g., EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 683 (8th Cir. 2012); Nash v. 
Electrospace Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 401, 403–04 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 145 See Schlinker & Payok, supra note 12 at 30 (“Employers may also be responsible, howev-
er, for a hostile environment created by non-employees, such as customers, if a court determines 
the employer could have fixed the problem. The logic of imposing this liability is not as sound, 
since the employer did not hire the customer and the employer has done absolutely nothing that 
would constitute harassment.”). 
 146 429 F.3d 689, 690, 693 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 147 Id. at 690. 
2017] Non-employee Discrimination  1195 
rior for intentional torts committed by an independent contractor.148 Vicari-
ous liability is irrelevant in non-employee harassment cases “because liabil-
ity under Title VII is direct rather than derivative.”149 Therefore, “it makes 
no difference whether the person whose acts are complained of is an em-
ployee, an independent contractor, or for that matter a customer,” because 
the “[a]bility to ‘control’ the actor plays no role.”150 Judge Easterbrook fur-
ther reasoned that “[e]mployees are not puppets on strings,” and that em-
ployers have a full “arsenal of incentives and sanctions” at their disposal to 
affect conduct.151 “It is the use (or failure to use) these options,” he ex-
plained, “that makes an employer responsible—and in this respect inde-
pendent contractors are no different from employees.”152 To illustrate this 
key point, Judge Easterbrook provided a hypothetical: 
Suppose a patient kept a macaw in his room, that the bird bit and 
scratched women but not men, and that the Hospital did nothing. 
The Hospital would be responsible for the decision to expose 
women to the working conditions affected by the macaw, even 
though the bird (a) was not an employee, and (b) could not be 
controlled by reasoning or sanctions. It would be the Hospital’s 
responsibility to protect its female employees by excluding the of-
fending bird from its premises.153 
From this, Judge Easterbrook concluded: “The employer’s responsibility is 
to provide its employees with nondiscriminatory working conditions. The 
genesis of inequality matters not; what does matter is how the employer 
handles the problem.”154 Judge Easterbrook’s position, which other courts 
have endorsed, essentially reduces employers to gatekeepers who must pro-
tect their employees from any discrimination that occurs within the work-
place, regardless of its source.155 Under this view, the only thing that mat-
ters is the employer’s response to the harassment; the source of the harass-
ment is immaterial. 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Id. 
 149 See id. at 691. 
 150 Id. 
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 152 Dunn, 429 F.3d at 691. 
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 155 See, e.g., Grasty v. World Flavors, Inc., No. 11-1778, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89277, at 
*24 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2011); Davis v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 733 F. Supp. 2d 474, 487 (D. 
Del. 2010); Bodman v. Me., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 720 F. Supp. 2d 115, 122 n.7 (D. 
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Other circuits have articulated slightly different justifications for hold-
ing employers to the same standard in non-employee and coworker harass-
ment cases. For instance, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a theory of employ-
er liability grounded in negligence and ratification rather than intentional 
discrimination.156 From this perspective, employers ratify or condone non-
employee harassment when they fail to respond adequately to such discrim-
ination; it is as if the employer itself harassed the employee.157 By contrast, 
the Second Circuit bases employer liability on “the extent of the employer’s 
control and any other legal responsibility which the employer may have 
with respect to the conduct of such non-employees.”158 The Fifth Circuit 
has explained that employer liability for non-employee harassment derives 
from the “employer’s failure to act in accordance with its statutory duty not 
to discriminate in the workplace . . . by requiring an employee to work in 
. . . an abusive working environment.”159 Like Judge Easterbrook, none of 
these circuits seems particularly concerned with the absence of an agency 
relationship between employers and non-employees. Instead, their focus 
rests primarily on how the employer responds to the harassment. 
Like in conventional coworker harassment cases, often the most con-
tested element of non-employee harassment cases is whether the employer 
knew or should have known about the harassment and responded appropri-
ately. In Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., Lori Freeman sued her employer for 
failing to protect her from repeated harassment by an independent sales rep-
resentative.160 The non-employee purportedly subjected Freeman to a bar-
rage of derogatory names, made comments to her about women he had been 
with the night before, passed gas on her phone, and once told her he was “as 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See Galdamez, 415 F.3d at 1022 (“An employer may be held liable for the actionable 
third-party harassment of its employees where it ratifies or condones the conduct by failing to 
investigate and remedy it after learning of it.”); Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 
958, 968 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding employer liable where, by “failing to take immediate and effec-
tive corrective action,” it “ratified” rape of an employee by a potential client); Folkerson v. Circus 
Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We now hold that an employer may be 
held liable for sexual harassment on the part of a private individual . . . where the employer either 
ratifies or acquiesces in the harassment by not taking immediate and/or corrective actions when it 
knew or should have known of the conduct.”). 
 157 See Galdamez, 415 F.3d at 1022; Little, 301 F.3d at 968 (holding employer liable where, 
by “failing to take immediate and effective corrective action,” it “ratified” rape of employee by 
potential client); Folkerson, 107 F.3d at 756 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We now hold that an employer may 
be held liable for sexual harassment on the part of a private individual . . . where the employer 
either ratifies or acquiesces in the harassment by not taking immediate and/or corrective actions 
when it knew or should have known of the conduct.”). 
 158 See Summa, 708 F.3d at 124 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2012)). 
 159 See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1020. 
 160 750 F.3d at 416. 
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f***ed up as a n****r’s checkbook.”161 In reversing summary judgment for 
the employer, the Fourth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could conclude 
that Dal-Tile knew or should have known of the harassment because Free-
man complained to her supervisor on multiple occasions and the supervisor 
witnessed Freeman cry and leave the room when the harasser passed gas on 
her phone.162 The court further explained that even if the supervisor did not 
have actual knowledge that Freeman was offended by the behavior, “at the 
very least, she should have known it” because she was “aware of [the har-
asser’s] on-going inappropriate behavior and comments, had received sev-
eral complaints . . . , [and] had witnessed Freeman crying from the harass-
ment . . . .”163 The court further found that a fact issue persisted as to the 
adequacy of Dal-Tile’s response.164 Dal-Tile did not take any effective ac-
tion until the harassment had been ongoing for three years, and although the 
company told Freeman it would permanently ban the harasser from its facil-
ity, it quickly lifted the ban and instead simply prohibited him from com-
municating with her.165 
In EEOC v. Cromer Food Services, Inc., the EEOC brought suit on be-
half of Ray Howard, who claimed he suffered “a daily barrage of lewd 
comments and gestures” by employees of a hospital, Cromer’s biggest cli-
ent, as he stocked vending machines at the client site.166 Hospital employees 
allegedly harassed Howard by leaving him a note calling him gay, referring 
to him as “Homo Howard,” and making unwanted sexual comments to him 
as they groped themselves.167 Howard complained to various supervisors, 
but they laughed at him, ignored him, and even told him that Cromer “was 
not responsible for the hospital but only responsible for [its own] employ-
ees.”168 Howard claimed that when he told the chairman of the board of di-
rectors about the harassment, the chairman became “visibly upset” and re-
sponded, “[D]o you not realize this could cost me everything?”169 Only af-
ter Cromer discovered that Howard had filed an EEOC charge did it offer to 
move him to a different shift.170 Howard declined the offer because the new 
shift conflicted with his childcare responsibilities.171 In the ensuing lawsuit, 
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Cromer claimed it did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the har-
assment because Howard’s complaints were “vague and insufficiently de-
tailed,” and he failed to follow company protocol requiring employees to 
report harassment to the president.172 In reversing summary judgment for 
the employer, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that “to fault Howard for failing 
to communicate more information about the incidents or for ineffectively 
conveying their gravity . . . . would be a perversion of the law of anti-
harassment, which although requires notice to the employer, does not and 
should not require it to be pellucid.”173 The court further determined Crom-
er’s offer to move Howard to a less desirable shift was an insufficient reme-
dy if it resulted in Howard being worse off, and that regardless, it was “too 
little, too late” because Howard endured months of inaction before the 
company even attempted to address his complaints.174 
Moreover, in Aguiar v. Bartlesville Care Center, Diana Aguiar sued 
her former employer, a residential health care facility, for failing to protect 
her from a resident’s sexual harassment.175 Aguiar, a certified nurse assis-
tant, claimed the resident repeatedly subjected her to unwanted touching 
and verbal abuse.176 The center was aware the resident had been “involved 
in criminal proceedings concerning domestic abuse, assault and battery, and 
violation of a protective order” and likewise knew the resident targeted 
Aguiar for harassment.177 The center took some steps to end the harassment 
by speaking with the resident and ordering that two other people be present 
when attending to him.178 When these solutions failed, the center claimed it 
“offered Ms. Aguiar the opportunity to move to the other side of the build-
ing and away from the resident.”179 Aguiar denied any such offer was made 
and further pointed out that even if the center had suggested she move, 
“there were no attempts made by management . . . to change my hall or fol-
low through with such a suggestion.”180 In reversing summary judgment for 
the employer, the Tenth Circuit concluded that a rational trier of fact could 
find the center’s response inadequate.181 Although the center took some 
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steps to remedy the harassment, whether it should have done more was a 
question best left for a jury.182 
By contrast, when an employer acts promptly to remedy non-employee 
harassment, the courts do not hesitate to award the employer summary 
judgment. For example, in Summa v. Hofstra University, the Second Circuit 
had little difficulty concluding the university’s response to non-employee 
harassment was adequate.183 Hofstra hired graduate student Lauren Summa 
as a manager for the football team.184 During Summa’s employment, mem-
bers of the football team sexually harassed her by “creat[ing] a Facebook 
page insulting both her and her boyfriend,” and by making sexually offen-
sive comments to her as the team watched a film containing “numerous sex 
scenes” during a bus ride home from an away game.185 When Summa com-
plained to the head coach about the offensive Facebook posts, the coach 
“promptly spoke to the three players involved . . . and instructed the players 
to remove the posts.”186 They complied, and no further online postings were 
directed at Summa.187 When Summa complained to an assistant coach about 
the movie and the players’ corresponding behavior, he immediately turned 
off the movie, “instructed [the players] to be quiet and stationed himself 
near Summa for the rest of the bus ride.”188 Within forty-eight hours, the 
head coach investigated the incident and kicked one of the offending play-
ers off the team.189 Thereafter, the university administration required all ath-
letics staff to complete additional sexual harassment training.190 In affirming 
summary judgment for Hofstra, the court concluded there was no fact issue 
as to the reasonableness of the university’s response because it promptly 
and effectively addressed both incidents, expelled the offending player, and 
provided employees with additional sexual harassment training, thus taking 
“proactive steps to create a better environment for all employees in the fu-
ture.”191 
Similarly, in Whiting v. Labat-Anderson, Inc., the district court granted 
summary judgment to the employer based on its prompt and reasonable re-
sponse to an employee’s allegations of harassment.192 Labat hired Paula 
                                                                                                                           
 182 Id. 
 183 708 F.3d at 132. 
 184 Id. at 120. 
 185 Id. at 120–21. 
 186 Id. at 124. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 124–25. 
 189 Id. at 125. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 See 926 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117–19 (D.D.C. 2013). 
1200 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1169 
Whiting to provide temporary, on-site general office services to the De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”).193 Whiting alleged that during the course of 
her employment, a DOJ paralegal inappropriately hugged her, kissed her 
neck, grabbed her chest, and pinned her to a desk on two occasions.194 
Whiting reported this incident to her supervisor the same day, and in re-
sponse the supervisor asked Whiting if she wanted to make a complaint.195 
Whiting stated that she did not want to make a complaint because “she did 
not want to get anyone in trouble.”196 Instead, she wanted her supervisor to 
reassign her and otherwise keep her away from the alleged harasser.197 The 
supervisor immediately notified the paralegal’s supervisor of the allega-
tions, spoke directly to the paralegal, and changed office procedures to de-
crease contact between Whiting and the paralegal.198 The supervisor’s re-
sponse was effective, as there were no other incidents involving Whiting 
and the paralegal.199 The court determined these measures, coupled with the 
absence of any further complaints from Whiting, proved the employer took 
“timely, appropriate, and reasonable action,” thus entitling it to summary 
judgment.200 
These cases illustrate the highly fact-specific nature of the courts’ 
analysis of non-employee harassment. Consequently, few doctrinal princi-
ples have emerged from the case law pertinent to non-employee discrimina-
tion, and a number of questions still abound regarding the limits of employ-
er liability in these instances. Should courts be more sympathetic to em-
ployers who claim they did not know, or had no reason to know, of non-
employee harassment when a third party outside the employer’s control, 
rather than a coworker directly under the employer’s control, commits the 
discrimination? Should courts hold employers to a lower standard in terms 
of responding to non-employee harassment, given the fact that employers 
cannot discipline or fire non-employee harassers like they could coworker 
harassers? Although these issues may be subsumed in the courts’ “reasona-
bleness” analysis, it would be prudent for courts to address these questions 
head on.201 
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B. Discriminatory Preferences/Requests 
Unlike third-party harassment cases, where the non-employee directly 
discriminates against the employee, in discriminatory preference/request 
cases the non-employee—typically a customer or client—discriminates 
against the employee indirectly by pressuring the employer to take em-
ployment actions that accommodate the non-employee’s discriminatory 
preference.202 Sometimes customers make explicit demands,203 other times 
they may merely express a preference for a certain type of employee,204 and 
in some cases the employer simply infers or assumes a discriminatory pref-
erence based on customer data, behavioral patterns, or anecdotal evi-
dence.205 In many customer preference cases, the employer deliberately 
mistreats certain workers to keep the customer satisfied. However, occa-
sionally customer preference will prompt an employer to adopt facially neu-
tral policies that disparately impact a particular group. The courts apply dif-
ferent analytical frameworks depending on whether customer preference 
leads to disparate treatment206 or disparate impact.207 
1. Disparate Treatment 
Customer preference cases typically involve allegations that the em-
ployer deliberately discriminated against employees in order to accommo-
date a customer’s discriminatory preferences, whether expressed or as-
sumed. In such cases, the employer is the discriminatory actor insofar as it 
takes the adverse employment action. However (and somewhat uniquely), 
discriminatory animus on the employer’s part typically does not motivate 
the adverse employment decision.208 Instead, the motivation is customer 
satisfaction—a seemingly legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose. Indeed, an 
employer that refuses to hire Latino employees because customers would 
boycott the business may be more motivated by wanting to attract custom-
                                                                                                                           
 202 See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (Diaz II), 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 
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ers than by any racial bias. Yet the absence of discriminatory motive is of no 
importance to the courts in such a circumstance; it is the employer’s actions, 
not its motives, that justify holding employers liable in such cases. 
Significantly, not all customer preference based discrimination is ille-
gal under federal antidiscrimination laws. Title VII contains a provision that 
allows employers to discriminate if the employer can show that sex, reli-
gion, or national origin—but not race209—constitutes a “bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise.”210 The Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 contains a similar provision.211 The Supreme Court has 
cautioned that the BFOQ defense “provides only the narrowest of excep-
tions to the general rule requiring equality of employment,” and has made 
clear that the employer bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that 
the discrimination was “reasonably necessary” to the job at issue.212 
What is the judicial rationale for holding employers liable in most cus-
tomer preference cases despite their lack of discriminatory animus? The 
answer to this question finds its origins in the seminal case on customer 
preference: Diaz v. Pan American World Airlines, Inc.213 Pan Am main-
tained a policy of hiring only female flight attendants.214 When the airline 
rejected Celio Diaz’s employment application on this basis, Diaz brought 
suit alleging sex discrimination under Title VII.215 Pan Am defended its pol-
icy by claiming that being female was a BFOQ for its flight attendants.216 
The airline argued that in its experience, female attendants outperformed 
male attendants in the non-mechanical aspects of the job such as “providing 
reassurance to anxious passengers, giving courteous personalized service 
and, in general, making flights as pleasurable as possible.”217 Pan Am also 
presented evidence that its passengers “overwhelmingly preferred to be 
                                                                                                                           
 209 But see Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 615 F.2d 650, 653–54 (5th Cir. 1980) 
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 210 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012).  
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served by female stewardesses.”218 Although Pan Am prevailed in the dis-
trict court, it had no such luck before the Fifth Circuit.219 The appellate 
court centered its rationale on what it considered Title VII’s chief purpose 
of “provid[ing] equal access to the job market for both men and women.”220 
Even if Pan Am itself bore no discriminatory animus toward men, allowing 
customers’ discriminatory preferences to dictate the airline’s employment 
decisions was enough to trigger liability under Title VII.221 The court was 
not entirely unsympathetic to Pan Am’s predicament, acknowledging that 
“the public’s expectation of finding one sex in a particular role may cause 
some initial difficulty.”222 But while singling out the employer for liability 
perhaps was not the most equitable solution, the court thought it necessary 
to serve Title VII’s overarching purposes: “[I]t would be totally anomalous 
if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers to de-
termine whether the sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large 
extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome.”223 Signifi-
cantly, the court recognized an employer can lawfully accommodate a cus-
tomer’s discriminatory preferences in certain cases but set the bar almost 
impossibly high: Customer preference discrimination is only lawful if the 
preference “is based on the company’s inability to perform the primary 
function or service it offers” absent such discrimination.224 
Since Diaz, many courts have come down hard on employers that dis-
criminate or retaliate in the name of customer preference.225 Courts have on 
occasion recognized the obvious catch-22 this creates for employers,226 yet 
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remain resolute in refusing to allow customer preference to end-run legal pro-
scriptions against discrimination and retaliation, most hardships notwithstand-
ing.227 For instance, in Tamosaitis v. URS Energy & Construction, Inc., the 
most recent appellate case to address customer preference, Dr. Walter Tamo-
saitis brought suit under the Energy Reorganization Act against URS, his em-
ployer, for acquiescing to a contractor’s demand that he be taken off a project 
for whistleblowing.228 The Department of Energy (“DOE”) contracted with 
Bechtel National, Inc. to assist in its clean-up efforts at a former nuclear 
weapons production facility.229 Bechtel in turn subcontracted with URS to 
perform some of the cleanup responsibilities.230 During the cleanup, Dr. Ta-
mosaitis presented many safety concerns not only at a Bechtel meeting, but 
also directly to several Bechtel employees.231 Bechtel’s management was out-
raged by Dr. Tamosaitis’ actions, believing it could jeopardize their six mil-
lion dollar fee from the DOE, and demanded URS remove him from the pro-
ject immediately.232 A few days later, Dr. Tamosaitis was fired from the pro-
ject and reassigned, in a nonsupervisory role, to a basement office at a differ-
ent facility.233 In reversing the lower court’s award of summary judgment to 
the employer, the Ninth Circuit took URS to task for its “the-customer-made-
me-do-it” defense.234 Like in discriminatory preference cases, the court found 
that “the presence of an employer’s subjective retaliatory animus is irrele-
vant.”235 It explained that “[t]he relevant causal connection is not between 
retaliatory animus and personnel action, but rather between protected activity 
and personnel action,” such that “there is no meaningful distinction between 
an employer who takes action based on its own retaliatory animus and one 
that acts to placate the retaliatory animus of a customer.”236 
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In many customer preference cases the controlling inquiry seems to be 
whether allowing the employer to cater to customer preference would un-
dercut Title VII’s goal of eradicating discrimination in the workplace. If so, 
the employer is on the hook for discrimination absent a successful BFOQ 
defense. For example, in Sparenberg v. Eagle Alliance, James Sparenberg’s 
employer moved him from his system analyst assignment with the National 
Security Agency (“NSA”) to a less prestigious client after the NSA request-
ed the change due to Sparenberg missing too much work to care for his sick 
wife.237 His employer honored the NSA’s request, even though Sparenberg 
was entitled to the leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
(“FMLA”).238 Sparenberg brought an FMLA retaliation claim, to which his 
employer responded that it was simply honoring its client’s request.239 The 
court rejected this argument, characterizing it as an attempt to “push[] 
blame for Sparenberg’s transfer onto its client.”240 Citing a string of Title 
VII cases, the court proclaimed that “[a]n employer may not immunize its 
actions by ducking behind the preferences of a client.”241 This is because of 
the “broader employment law principle that the employer has the ultimate 
responsibility for providing a non-discriminatory working environment—
even when third parties are creating discriminatory conditions.”242 
In Williams v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA), Inc., the court rejected 
G4S’s claim that it reassigned Williams to a less desirable client only be-
cause the client to whom she was assigned demanded only male security 
guards.243 In rejecting G4S’s “the-client-made-me-do-it” defense, the court 
observed that “[c]ourts have repeatedly held employers responsible for dis-
crimination against their employees, even when the employer itself claimed 
to be free of bias.”244 The court found the employer’s defense incongruous 
Title VII because staffing companies, like other employers, “are not insulat-
ed from liability, so as to discriminate with impunity, merely because they 
are satisfying the requests or directives of their clients.”245 Similarly, in 
Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Center, the employer could not escape lia-
bility for reassigning Chaney different job duties because certain nursing 
home residents refused to be treated by black nurses.246 In reversing the 
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lower court, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that “[i]t is now widely accepted 
that a company’s desire to cater to the perceived racial preferences of its 
customers is not a defense under Title VII for treating employees differently 
based on race.”247 The court rejected the employer’s claim that an exception 
should be made for long-term care facilities or that the applicable state pa-
tients’ rights law mandated such an exception.248 
The cases where courts have permitted employers to discriminate 
based on customer preference are few and far between. Indeed, the courts 
have acknowledged BFOQs in just three contexts: where privacy,249 safe-
ty,250 or genuineness251 is concerned. Some courts insist customer prefer-
ence can never be a BFOQ,252 but this seems an issue of semantics, given 
that privacy, safety, and genuineness concerns easily can be recast as cus-
tomer preferences: A client insists on having male security guards because 
they make customers feel safe, a female customer requests a female mas-
seuse because she is uncomfortable with a male masseuse touching her 
body, and audiences prefer a white man play the role of Jean Valjean in a 
production of Les Miserables. 253 
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Although proving a customer preference related BFOQ defense can be 
extremely difficult, employers have found modest success when the prefer-
ence is rooted in privacy concerns. For example, in Wade v. Napolitano, the 
district court granted summary judgment to the Transportation Security 
Administration (“TSA”) on a claim that it engaged in sex discrimination by 
requiring that one-third of its screeners be female.254 The court determined 
sex constituted a BFOQ based on the privacy interests of passengers.255 The 
court found persuasive evidence that TSA implemented the policy in direct 
response to passengers’ concerns about their privacy and security: 
Customer satisfaction surveys revealed that the same-gender 
screening procedures met the public’s expectations . . . . [while] 
also further[ing] TSA’s ultimate objective of providing security as 
the TSA found that if passengers are more comfortable with how 
searchers [sic] are conducted, then they are less likely to object 
and more likely to comply with pat-down requests, resulting in a 
quicker screening process and more thorough inspection.256 
By comparison, the safety-based BFOQ cases focus more on the abil-
ity to protect customers and other clientele than on explicit demands from 
such persons for employees who will keep them safe. For instance, in Do-
thard v. Rawlinson, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Alabama’s creation of 
male-only and female-only positions in its prison system because maintain-
ing prison security was the “essence” of a correction officer’s job.257 Cau-
tioning that “the BFOQ exception [is] in fact meant to be an extremely nar-
row exception,” the Court nevertheless upheld the defense by emphasizing 
the “peculiarly inhospitable” environment of the prison, characterized by a 
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“jungle atmosphere” and “rampant violence.”258 Outside of Dothard, courts 
have only upheld safety-based BFOQs where pregnancy reduces an em-
ployee’s capabilities to perform essential work.259 
There has been remarkably little litigation over whether employers can 
discriminate based on customers’ preferences for genuineness or authentici-
ty. The EEOC has taken the position that only sex can constitute a BFOQ 
where authenticity or genuineness is at issue.260 The courts tend to agree 
with the EEOC that sex can constitute a BFOQ for authenticity purposes261 
but have left the door open to the possibility of race and national origin-
based authenticity BFOQs as well.262 
2. Disparate Impact Discrimination 
Sometimes customer preferences lead employers to enact facially neu-
tral policies that disparately impact a certain group of employees. In such 
cases, a plaintiff must assert a disparate impact claim because the chal-
lenged policy is facially neutral, rather than deliberately discriminatory.263 
The BFOQ defense is not available to employers in disparate impact cas-
es.264 Nevertheless, an employer can still prevail if it proves the policy is 
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Chinese restaurant). See generally, Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and 
Entertainment Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 473 
(2001). 
 263 See Tyler v. Manhattan, 118 F.3d 1400, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that “courts have 
found it useful to distinguish between intentional discrimination, often labeled as ‘disparate treat-
ment,’ and unintentional or incidental discrimination, labeled as ‘disparate impact’”). 
 264 See UAW, Inc., 499 U.S. at 198–200. 
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job related and consistent with business necessity.265 Although the BFOQ 
and business necessity defenses are quite similar, they differ in one key re-
gard: An employer can never justify race discrimination as a BFOQ,266 but 
it can justify race discrimination as a business necessity.267 This difference 
could lead to oddly incongruent results. For example, if a customer com-
ments to a restaurant manager that she refuses to be served by anyone with 
dreadlocks, and the manager subsequently fires all of the black servers, the 
employer could not assert a BFOQ defense to a disparate treatment claim. 
But, if the employer implements a “no dreadlocks policy” resulting in the 
termination of all black servers, it could assert a business necessity defense 
to a disparate impact claim. 
EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC illustrates how the courts approach cus-
tomer preference-based disparate impact claims.268 The EEOC brought a 
disparate impact claim against Sephora, a cosmetics retailer, after the com-
pany implemented a policy requiring employees to speak English to cus-
tomers.269 Sephora conceded its policy disparately impacted Hispanic em-
ployees but maintained the policy was job related and consistent with its 
business needs of politeness and approachability as components of custom-
er service.270 Although nothing in the record suggested customers explicitly 
demanded that employees speak English, Sephora inferred such a prefer-
ence.271 The court granted Sephora summary judgment based on its deter-
mination that customer preference was sufficiently related to job perfor-
                                                                                                                           
 265See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); see also UAW, Inc., 499 U.S. at 198–200 (noting 
different applications of BFOQ and business necessity defenses and holding that the business 
necessity defense, not the BFOQ defense, is the appropriate standard in disparate impact cases); 
Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 474 (11th Cir. 1999) (“When a facially neutral practice 
is challenged for its disparate impact, an employer need not assert a BFOQ for justification, but 
may argue instead that the practice is grounded in a legitimate, job-related purpose.”).  
 266 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). 
 267 See, e.g., El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 245–48 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that a 
criminal background policy that disparately impacted blacks was justified as a business necessity); 
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‘clinker’ in this otherwise symmetrical reasoning. The statutory BFOQ defense . . . is not permit-
ted as a defense to race discrimination in employment.”). 
 268 See 419 F. Supp. 2d 408, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 269 Id. at 410–11. An employee did not have to speak English, however, if the customer ex-
pressed a preference to speak in a different language. Id. 
 270 Id. at 416. 
 271 Id. (“‘[T]he Company . . . expects employees who are hired and trained specifically to 
serve clients to speak English while on the sales floor out of respect for the client and in order to 
remain approachable to clients at all times’ [—] ‘a common sense rule against offending custom-
ers.’”) (quoting Rivera v. Baccarat, 10 F. Supp. 2d 318, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). 
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mance so as to qualify as a business necessity.272 The link between customer 
preference and job performance was critical in the court’s mind because it 
“prevents employers from using customers’ intolerance as a business neces-
sity justification.”273 The court found:  
[h]elpfulness, politeness and approachability . . . are central to the 
job of a sales employee at a retail establishment, and are distinct 
from customers’ prejudices. When salespeople speak in a lan-
guage customers do not understand, the effects on helpfulness, 
politeness and approachability are real and are not a matter of ab-
stract preference.274 
As the cases analyzed in this Part illustrate, the courts employ a variety 
of frameworks when assessing employer liability for non-employee dis-
crimination. In harassment cases, the courts apply a negligence standard; in 
customer preference cases, they consider whether the discrimination is justi-
fied under a BFOQ or business necessity defense. These varying approaches 
generally serve their respective purposes in cases where discrimination is 
conscious, intentional, and relatively easy to spot. But as non-employee dis-
crimination becomes more pervasive and harder for employers to detect, a 
more flexible analytical framework that both unites and simplifies the cur-
rent approach is both warranted and highly possible. 
IV. RETHINKING THE EMPLOYER LIABILITY STANDARD 
Non-employee discrimination will likely become even more prevalent 
in coming years as employees and non-employees have more frequent in-
teraction in the workplace and as non-employees have greater influence 
over employment decisions.275 At the same time, non-employee discrimina-
tion will become harder to detect, as discrimination becomes more subtle, 
unintentional, and even unconscious.276 As this perfect storm brews, now is 
an opportune time to consider how judicial treatment of non-employee dis-
crimination claims can be improved. 
The foregoing analysis of the case law reveals two major deficiencies 
with the current judicial approach to non-employee discrimination. First, 
the law draws no distinction between discrimination committed by employ-
ees and non-employees—despite glaring differences in how much control 
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 273 Id. at 417. 
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 275 See Flake, supra note 88, at 6–11; supra notes 31–70 and accompanying text.  
 276 See Flake, supra note 88, at 16–17; supra notes 71–134 and accompanying text. 
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employers are able to exercise over these different actors. Because employ-
ers alone are responsible for the discriminatory acts of non-employees, it 
makes sense that the liability standard should account for the limited control 
employers exert over non-employees’ behavior. Unfortunately, employer 
control factors very little into the courts’ analysis of non-employee discrim-
ination because judges mechanically apply the same frameworks and doc-
trines that are used in conventional discrimination cases. This approach is 
problematic because employment discrimination laws were not created with 
non-employee discrimination in mind. Rather, they were designed to ad-
dress employee-on-employee discrimination.277 As such, there was no need 
at the outset to factor employer control into the liability standard because 
control was assumed in most cases, given the agentic nature of the employ-
er-employee relationship. Applying the conventional employment discrimi-
nation framework to non-employee discrimination is akin to fitting a square 
peg into a round hole: The framework functions relatively well for conven-
tional discrimination claims but generates incongruent and often unfair re-
sults in the non-employee discrimination context.278 
The second problem with the current judicial approach is that it is not 
adequately equipped to handle the harder cases, where non-employees un-
consciously discriminate against employees either directly or indirectly. It is 
one thing for the law to hold an employer liable for failing to stop a vendor 
from explicitly harassing an employee or for acquiescing to a client’s highly 
discriminatory demand but it is quite another to hold an employer liable for 
its customers’ unconscious discriminatory tipping practices or for basing 
employment decisions on implicitly biased customer feedback. That is not 
to say employers should be absolved from liability in these harder cases, but 
rather that the law should adopt an analytical framework that can fairly and 
effectively administer justice in such situations. 
Rather than inventing some entirely new scheme, I argue in this Part 
that the courts should adopt a simple, unified approach that adequately ac-
counts for employers’ diminished control over non-employees and that can 
be applied easily to all forms of non-employee discrimination. Under this 
approach, the courts would need only ask two questions: Did the employer 
know, or should it reasonably have known, about the non-employee dis-
crimination?279 If so, did the employer act reasonably in how it responded 
                                                                                                                           
 277 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining that workplace communication used 
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 278 See supra notes 138–201 (discussing instances where the employer was found liable for 
non-employee discrimination) 
 279 See infra notes 283–300 and accompanying text. 
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to the discrimination?280 This analytical framework more fairly apportions 
employer liability while also reordering and refining the existing doctrines 
into a more flexible approach that is better suited for the unique challenges 
of non-employee discrimination. 
A. Employer Knowledge of Non-employee Discrimination 
Under the proposed framework, the first question a court must ask is 
whether the employer knew or should reasonably have known that a non-
employee acted in a discriminatory manner. Although it makes sense for 
antidiscrimination laws to position employers as gatekeepers whose job is 
to protect employees from discriminatory conditions in the workplace, em-
ployers can only respond to discrimination of which they are actually 
aware. Non-employee discrimination presents unique challenges in this re-
gard. It can be much harder to monitor non-employees’ behavior because 
they are not under an employer’s direct control. For example, an employer 
would have no way of knowing that one of its delivery drivers is being sex-
ually harassed by employees of a store on her delivery route unless the em-
ployee herself advises the employer of the harassment. An additional chal-
lenge is the fact that employees may not recognize mistreatment by non-
employees as harassment because harassment trainings and policies tend to 
focus on narrow definitions of harassment.281 If an employee herself does 
not recognize the mistreatment as harassment, her employer would have no 
way of knowing that she is being harassed. Moreover, as non-employees 
continue to exert greater control over employing functions such as compen-
sation,282 employees understandably may be more reluctant to report non-
employee harassment to their employers out of fear non-employees will 
retaliate against them. 
Perhaps employers’ biggest challenge in detecting non-employee dis-
crimination involves biased customer evaluations and feedback. To be clear, 
customers are not the only ones who provide biased employee evaluations; 
supervisors and coworkers are often guilty of this practice too.283 But cus-
                                                                                                                           
 280 See infra notes 301–321 and accompanying text. 
 281 See generally Elissa L. Perry et al., Sexual Harassment Training: Recommendations to 
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tomer feedback presents unique challenges in that it is often anonymous, 
brief, narrow in scope, and based on limited interactions.284 It may also be 
less accurate, given that customers often have even less training than super-
visors in how to properly evaluate an employee’s performance.285 Addition-
ally, the largely anonymous nature of customer feedback, coupled with the 
complete absence of any repercussions from the employer, may encourage 
customers to give conscious, yet hard-to-detect discriminatory feedback.286 
For instance, a customer who dislikes Muslims could rate her Muslim wait-
er’s objectively outstanding service as unsatisfactory on a customer review 
card that she then anonymously drops in the customer feedback box on her 
way out of the restaurant. Unless the customer wrote an explicitly discrimi-
natory comment on the card—for example, “Fire all Muslims!”—the em-
ployer would have no way of knowing the feedback was not only inaccurate 
but also tainted by extreme bias. Although supervisory and coworker re-
views can also be biased, at least employers have the ability to “cross exam-
ine” the employee reviewer.287 Furthermore, given the non-anonymous na-
ture of such reviews, supervisors may be less likely to consciously discrim-
inate in their evaluations of other employees out of fear their employer will 
accuse them of discrimination.288 
Of course, the fact that non-employee discrimination may be harder to 
detect should not insulate an employer from liability. Despite their limita-
tions, employers are still the best positioned to protect employees from dis-
criminatory working conditions, whether internally or externally imposed. 
                                                                                                                           
phenomenon the researchers attribute to unconscious employer bias that inhibits reviewers from 
“connect[ing] women’s contributions to business outcomes or . . . acknowledg[ing] their technical 
expertise”); Jeffrey H. Greenhaus et al., Effects of Race on Organizational Experiences, Job Per-
formance Evaluations, and Career Outcomes, 33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 64, 68–69 (1990) (finding that 
blacks received lower ratings from their supervisors on their job performance and promotability). 
 284 See Hekman et al., supra note 126, at 240–41 (noting that customer satisfaction ratings 
may be more susceptible to negative stereotypes and biases than employer evaluations because 
“customers are afforded the luxury of anonymity . . . . are asked to make summary judgment ra-
ther than to accurately recollected performance-related behaviors, and are untrained in techniques 
that might help them overcome unconscious biases”); Wang, supra note 9, at 281–85 (analyzing 
studies on bias in customer feedback). 
 285 See Hekman et al., supra note 126, at 241 (“Customers are not trained in or expected to 
use [bias-reducing] techniques when forming satisfaction judgments.”). 
 286 See id., at 240–41 (“Customer anonymity does not motivate raters to reduce bias, and 
customer satisfaction questionnaire instructions and items may even facilitate the expression of 
such biases.”). 
 287 See id. (“[S]upervisors, but not customers, know that their ratings are part of the employee 
record . . . . Supervisors can not only be identified, but also must justify their ratings, and as such 
they are even more motivated to engage in effortful information processing to help them reduce 
the influence of racial or gender bias and appear, at least superficially, to be objective.”). 
 288 See id. 
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For this reason, employers cannot be permitted to adopt a “see no evil, hear 
no evil” approach to non-employee discrimination.289 We want and need em-
ployers who not only are vigilant but are also proactive in recognizing when 
discrimination infiltrates their workplaces. To this end, it is not enough to 
hold employers liable only for the non-employee discrimination of which 
they are aware; liability must also extend to cases in which the employer 
reasonably should have been aware of the discrimination. A reasonable-
knowledge standard is flexible enough to take into account the aforemen-
tioned difficulties of detecting non-employee discrimination. For example, 
it may be reasonable for an employer to claim ignorance where a custom-
er’s feedback shows no hint of bias, whereas it may be unreasonable for an 
employer not to have known its delivery employee, who wears a body cam-
era at all times while on her route, is being sexually harassed by customers. 
Moreover, the reasonableness standard could very likely change over time 
as social scientists learn more, and employers become better educated, 
about the subtle and nuanced ways in which individuals discriminate in 
modern society. As we come to better understand the intricacies of contem-
porary discrimination, it would be reasonable to expect employers to use 
this knowledge to better detect discrimination. 
Although a reasonable-knowledge requirement already exists for non-
employee harassment claims,290 it would require a modest shift in how 
courts evaluate other types of non-employee discrimination. In discrimina-
tory preference cases, the courts seem to give no thought to whether the 
employer knew it was honoring a discriminatory request when it took an 
adverse action to appease the non-employee.291 This may be due to the fact 
that the extant case law only involves customer preferences and requests 
that are blatantly discriminatory.292 Nevertheless, one can easily envision 
scenarios in which such discrimination is less obvious. In Lingle v. Safety 
and Ecology Corp., Marilyn Lingle alleged her employer passed her over 
for a promotion because of her age and sex.293 Her employer countered that 
it gave the promotion to a younger male because an influential client had 
recommended he be promoted.294 The court accepted this as a valid reason, 
                                                                                                                           
 289 See Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 334 (4th Cir. 2003) (“An employer 
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concluding that “[s]electing an employee for a position based upon a cus-
tomer’s preference for a particular employee is a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for selecting that employee.”295 But what if the client 
recommended the younger male be promoted because, unknown to the em-
ployer, the client disliked older women? Should the employer have been 
held liable for unknowingly doing the client’s discriminatory bidding? Alt-
hough existing case law provides no definitive answer, this conundrum can 
be remedied easily enough by imposing a reasonable-knowledge require-
ment. Under such a standard, the Lingle court would have scrutinized 
whether the employer knew or reasonably should have known the client’s 
recommendation was discriminatory, rather than accepting the recommen-
dation at face value. 
A reasonable-knowledge requirement would also be useful in cases 
that otherwise would be analyzed under a disparate impact framework, such 
as where an employer’s facially neutral tipping policy results in black serv-
ers earning fewer tips than white servers.296 Although the thought of impos-
ing a knowledge requirement in disparate impact cases may seem unpalata-
ble to some, it makes good sense in the non-employee discrimination con-
text because an employer exercises much less control over non-employees 
than it does over its own employees. If employers must bear the entire bur-
den for non-employees’ discriminatory actions, it seems only fair to limit 
employer liability to situations in which the employer knows or reasonably 
should know its facially neutral policy produces discriminatory outcomes. 
Thus, in the case of discriminatory tipping, rather than holding an employer 
strictly liable for its customers’ discrimination—something over which it 
arguably has little control—the employer would only be liable if it knew or 
reasonably should have known its tipping policy produced disparate results. 
In all likelihood, a knowledge requirement would not present much of an 
obstacle for most plaintiffs: A simple employee complaint of unequal pay or 
a tip audit would seem sufficient to prove the employer knew or should 
have known its policy produced a disparate impact. Although this would 
shift some responsibility to employees to alert employers to the possibility 
of disparate impact, this does not seem unreasonable—particularly in light 
of the fact that employees already bear this responsibility in harassment 
cases.297 
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In sum, if federal antidiscrimination laws are going to position em-
ployers as gatekeepers who are responsible for protecting employees from 
all employment discrimination regardless of its source, it seems sensible 
that employers can only be liable for the non-employee discrimination they 
can reasonably be expected to detect. To borrow from Judge Easterbrook’s 
hypothetical, a hospital can only be liable for a patient’s macaw biting and 
scratching women if the hospital knows the macaw exists.298 At the same 
time, employers should actively monitor their workplaces to ensure em-
ployees are adequately protected from discrimination. Just as the hospital 
could not escape liability by claiming it never saw the macaw despite sever-
al reports of it flying around the building, an employer should not be al-
lowed to avoid liability by failing to adequately monitor its workplace. 
Holding employers liable for non-employee discrimination that they know 
about or reasonably should know about strikes an appropriate balance be-
tween requiring too much and too little of employers. Furthermore, this re-
quirement is flexible enough to work just as effectively in cases where dis-
crimination is blatant as in cases where discrimination is subtle. Moreover, 
the employer-knowledge requirement can easily be applied not just in non-
employee harassment cases but also to customer preference-based disparate 
impact and disparate treatment claims as well. 
B. Employer’s Reasonable Response to Non-employee Discrimination 
If an employer knew or reasonably should have known a non-
employee’s actions, preferences, or requests were discriminatory, the courts 
must then consider whether the employer acted reasonably in light of such 
knowledge. This standard would effectively combine the various defenses 
presently available to employers into a single, unified framework. In non-
employee harassment cases, employers with actual or constructive 
knowledge of the discrimination can avoid liability by showing they took 
“prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment.”299 In 
customer preference-based disparate treatment cases, employers can prevail 
by showing that “religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular 
business . . . .”300 And in customer preference-based disparate impact cases, 
an employer can defend itself by establishing that its policy or practice “is 
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job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessi-
ty . . . .”301 Although the wording of these defenses varies, in essence each 
holds employers to a reasonableness standard. Thus, merging these defenses 
into a single reasonableness standard hardly requires a radical departure 
from the current approach. A singular standard would provide much needed 
unity to the current fragmented approach and have the added benefit of re-
solving the aforementioned quirk in the law whereby customer-driven racial 
discrimination is forbidden in disparate treatment cases302 yet is sometimes 
permitted in disparate impact cases.303 
Under the proposed standard, the fact that the perpetrator of the dis-
crimination is a non-employee would directly factor into the reasonableness 
of the employer’s response. Judge Easterbrook’s observation that “[t]he 
genesis of inequality matters not”304 is accurate in the sense that an employ-
er has an obligation to reasonably respond to any discrimination that infil-
trates its workplace, whether from employees or non-employees. But in 
considering the reasonableness of an employer’s response, the genesis of 
the discrimination does—and should—matter. This is because employers 
tend to exercise much more control over employees than they do non-
employees. Employers can subject employees to harassment training, 
promulgate workplace rules and policies, monitor employee conduct, and 
discipline, suspend, or fire an employee who violates its harassment policy. 
Moreover, most employers have harassment reporting policies firmly in 
place that require employees to immediately report to specific members of 
management any harassment they experience or observe. By contrast, em-
ployers tend to have much less control over non-employees. Customers, in 
particular, can be especially difficult to manage. Consequently, it is neither 
realistic nor fair to hold employers to the same standards when evaluating 
the reasonableness of how they respond to non-employee discrimination as 
opposed to employee discrimination. Of course, employers cannot get a free 
pass simply because the discriminator is not under their direct control. The 
courts have made clear that employer inaction based on the perceived ina-
bility to control a non-employee is never justified.305 The fact that an em-
ployer may exercise less control over a non-employee does not mean it can-
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not exercise any control. The “arsenal of incentives and sanctions” employ-
ers have at their disposal in responding to non-employee discrimination 
may not be as full as Judge Easterbrook claims,306 but employers are not 
powerless in this regard. 
The reasonableness of an employer’s response to non-employee dis-
crimination may differ depending on the facts and circumstances of each 
case. In cases of direct, conscious discrimination, such as where a customer 
sexually harasses an employee, an employer would almost always be obli-
gated to take reasonable steps to end the harassment. Depending on the sit-
uation, such measures could include prominently displaying a customer 
code of conduct that makes clear that any harassing or otherwise discrimi-
natory behavior will not be tolerated,307 expanding workplace harassment 
policies and trainings to include non-employee discrimination, banning a 
non-employee harasser from the premises,308 reassigning an employee to a 
different location or job position to separate her from the harasser,309 audio 
or video surveillance, and having employees work in pairs so as never to be 
alone with a non-employee.310 An employer could also insist on contractual 
provisions with vendors, suppliers, and contractors that require such organi-
zations to provide harassment training to their employees, maintain antidis-
crimination policies, and monitor and adequately respond to incidents of 
discrimination. 
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Where discrimination is less obvious and results in disparate impact, 
what constitutes a reasonable response may present a more difficult ques-
tion. For instance, if a black waiter accuses an employer of maintaining a 
tip policy that disparately impacts blacks, what is a reasonable response? 
Under the current disparate impact framework, an employer can successful-
ly defend against such a claim only by showing the policy is job related and 
consistent with business necessity. This standard easily can be recast in 
terms of reasonableness: The employer acted reasonably if its tipping policy 
is job related and consistent with business necessity. Under the proposed 
standard, the employer could still prevail on a disparate impact claim by 
showing job relatedness and business necessity; but this would no longer be 
the employer’s sole defense. Other reasonable responses might include edu-
cating customers about unconscious discrimination in tipping, pooling tips, 
replacing tipping with a service charge, or eliminating tipping altogether.311 
Because this new framework would impose a knowledge requirement, an 
employer would not be liable for a facially neutral policy that has a dispar-
ate impact unless it is somehow aware of the problem and fails to take ap-
propriate action. In some cases—such as when an employer can prove the 
practice is reasonable because it is job related and consistent with business 
necessity—the appropriate action may be to do nothing. In other cases, the 
reasonable response might be to educate customers or perhaps revise poli-
cies. Either way, the employer would only be liable based on the reasona-
bleness of its response in light of its actual or constructive knowledge of the 
discrimination. 
In customer preference-based disparate treatment cases, where dis-
crimination is usually conscious and indirect, what constitutes a reasonable 
response from the employer may yet again differ. In some cases, it may be 
reasonable for the employer to acquiesce to the customer’s request. The 
BFOQ cases make clear that sometimes it is reasonable for an employer to 
honor discriminatory customer preferences, where safety, privacy, or genu-
ineness is concerned. Like the disparate impact defense, the BFOQ defense 
easily can be reconfigured as a question of reasonableness: Was the em-
ployer’s decision to honor the customer’s discriminatory request reasonable 
because sex is a bona fide occupational qualification that is reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operation of the business? 
                                                                                                                           
 311 See, e.g., Pete Wells, Danny Meyer Restaurants to Eliminate Tipping, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/dining/danny-meyer-restaurants-no-tips.html [https://
perma.cc/5VHW-NHAB] (reporting on restaurateur Danny Meyer’s announcement that he would 
eliminate tipping from his thirteen New York City restaurants and bars and stating that “[s]ome 
believe it is unfair for servers’ pay to be affected by their race and age, their customer’s moods, 
the weather and other factors that have nothing to do with performance”). 
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Lastly, in cases of indirect, unconscious discrimination, such as where 
an employer uses customer feedback that is unintentionally tainted by bias 
to make employment decisions, applying a reasonableness standard con-
verts what are potentially the hardest cases into a more straightforward 
analysis: If the employer knew or should have known the feedback was dis-
criminatory, did it act reasonably in light of this knowledge? Again, in some 
cases it may be reasonable for the employer to do nothing if it can prove its 
policy of basing employment decisions on customer feedback is job related 
and consistent with business necessity. In other cases, an employer may be 
able to show it acted reasonably by taking measures to minimize the risk of 
discriminatory feedback. For example, rather than soliciting anonymous, 
quantitative feedback from customers such as, “Rate the tour guide’s per-
formance on a scale of one to five,” a questionnaire could include open-
ended questions that force the respondent to articulate her experience. Em-
ployers could also solicit feedback through face-to-face interactions and 
focus groups. If an employer does solicit feedback through quantitative 
questions, perhaps it could exclude any outlier responses from its data anal-
ysis. To solve the problem of anonymity, an employer could require cus-
tomers to enter their contact information on the feedback form.312 
As gatekeepers to the workplace, employers can and should be liable 
for how they respond to non-employee discrimination that they either know 
or reasonably should know about. Under the current framework, employers 
can assert a variety of defenses to non-employee discrimination, all of 
which essentially go to the question of reasonableness.313 Reorganizing 
these defenses into a single reasonableness standard would help unify the 
existing case law, simplify and clarify an employer’s duty with regard to 
non-employee discrimination, and, in some cases, expand the options an 
employer has available in responding to such discrimination. 
C. Potential Implications 
The creation of a separate standard of employer liability for non-
employee discrimination acknowledges that non-employee discrimination 
differs from employee discrimination in ways that matter. Contrary to Judge 
Easterbrook’s claim, the “genesis of inequality”314 matters very much. It 
                                                                                                                           
 312 Indeed, an employer may use this tactic simply by requiring customer respondents to enter 
at least their email address so they can email them a coupon or discount code for completing the 
survey. 
 313 See supra notes 138–274 any accompanying text (discussing the different defenses an 
employer may use in a non-employee discrimination case). 
 314 See Dunn, 429 F.3d at 691. 
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matters because non-employee discrimination can be harder for an employ-
er to prevent and detect than coworker discrimination. It also matters to the 
extent an employer has fewer options in responding to discrimination by 
actors not under its direct control. 
If the law is going to continue to hold employers solely responsible for 
the discriminatory actions of non-employees but essentially give non-
employees a free pass to discriminate, it is fair and reasonable to create a 
standard of liability that recognizes this inequity. To be clear, the standard 
would remain unchanged in most cases. For instance, in non-employee har-
assment cases—a common and arguably most egregious form of non-
employee discrimination—the standard would remain virtually unchanged. 
In the harder cases, where discrimination is often indirect and/or un-
conscious, the new framework may lessen the employer’s burden in two 
important ways. First, the employer-knowledge requirement would protect 
employers from liability for all forms of non-employee discrimination that 
were neither known nor reasonably should have been known to the employ-
er. This requirement would be especially helpful to employers in cases 
where a customer disguises a discriminatory request as neutral (such as ask-
ing for a specific male employee to manage their account because the non-
employee secretly does not think a woman could do the job as well) and in 
cases where an employer maintains facially neutral policies that disparately 
impact a particular group (such as an employer who ties its bonus system to 
customer feedback but has no idea the customer feedback is tainted by un-
conscious customer bias). Second, the reasonable-response requirement 
would in some cases expand the options an employer has at its disposal to 
address non-employee discrimination. For example, in a discriminatory tip-
ping case, an employer could still defend itself by proving business necessi-
ty and job relatedness, but it could also prevail by showing it acted reasona-
bly by modifying its policies to create a more equitable distribution of tips 
once it was made aware of the problem. In all likelihood, these modest con-
cessions to employers would not cause employers to take non-employee 
discrimination less seriously. Because the new framework imposes reasona-
ble knowledge and reasonable response obligations on employers, there is 
no reason to think employers would be any less diligent in protecting em-
ployees from non-employee discrimination. If anything, this simplified, 
universal standard would bring much needed clarity to employers so they 
can protect their employees more effectively. 
In addition to more fairly apportioning liability for non-employee dis-
crimination, the proposed framework would unite the currently fragmented 
approaches into a single, uniform standard. Under the current system, an 
employer can sometimes be held liable only if it had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the non-employee discrimination (e.g., non-employee har-
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assment), whereas other times an employer can be liable even if it had no 
knowledge whatsoever of the discrimination (e.g., disparate impact cases). 
Moreover, in some cases an employer can only avoid liability by showing it 
acted promptly to end the discrimination (e.g., non-employee harassment), 
whereas in others it must justify the discrimination as a BFOQ reasonably 
related to the operation of the business (e.g., customer preference-based 
disparate treatment) or show the discrimination was job related and con-
sistent with business necessity (customer preference-based disparate im-
pact). Implementing a new framework to non-employee discrimination cas-
es does not require a radical departure from the existing approach. This new 
approach requires courts to ask just two questions: Did the employer have 
actual or constructive knowledge of the non-employee discrimination, and 
if so, was the employer’s response reasonable? This framework reorders 
existing principles from the case law into a commonsense approach that 
will unite the case law going forward while at the same time providing the 
flexibility necessary to ensure the framework can be easily applied to all 
forms of non-employee discrimination. 
Finally, this new framework acknowledges that the nature of discrimina-
tion in the United States has fundamentally changed, and will continue to do 
so in the years to come.315 As discrimination becomes less overt and more 
unconscious, it will likely become even harder to detect—especially when it 
comes from non-employees. The existing analytical framework functions rea-
sonably well when discrimination is relatively easy to spot but is less 
equipped to handle the harder cases. To date, the courts have managed to 
avoid the more challenging cases, such as discriminatory tipping and custom-
er feedback. A growing chorus of commentators warn, however, that these 
cases are coming down the pike.316 Unconscious discrimination can be just as 
devastating to an employee as is overt discrimination, if not more so.317 The 
                                                                                                                           
 315 See Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 482 (2005) (“The nature of discrimination today is dramatically 
different from the pernicious, overt discrimination that existed prior to the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.”). 
 316 See, e.g., Lynn, supra note 75, at 1057 (“Given the potential costs to a large restaurant 
chain of a class-action lawsuit alleging adverse impact from tipping, we believe that restaurant 
chains would be foolish to ignore the possibility of such legal action.”); Sachin Pandya, Tipping as 
Employment Discrimination?, WORKPLACE PROF. BLOG (Nov. 23, 2015), http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2015/11/tipping-as-employment-discrimination.html [https://perma.
cc/SEU4-VAP6] (arguing that despite the dearth of litigation on the issue, race disparity caused by 
tip compensation can trigger Title VII disparate impact liability). 
 317 See generally Samuel Noh et al., Overt and Subtle Racial Discrimination and Mental 
Health: Preliminary Findings for Korean Immigrants, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1269 (2007) (find-
ing that subtle racism is more psychologically damaging than overt racism because recipients can 
more easily shrug off overt discrimination, whereas subtle racism is more likely to be committed 
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potential harm of such discrimination must be weighed against the reality that 
unconscious discrimination tends to be more subtle and harder for employers 
to detect. Requiring employers to be reasonably aware of and to reasonably 
respond to such discrimination strikes an appropriate balance: Employers 
cannot rest on their laurels, but they need not be so obsessed with rooting out 
unconscious bias so as to overly burden their business operations. The pro-
posed framework works well in both the easy cases, where expectations of 
employer knowledge and response would be higher, and in the harder cases, 
where such expectations might necessarily be lower. 
CONCLUSION 
Non-employee discrimination is not going away anytime soon. In fact, 
the problem is likely to become more pervasive and complicated in the 
coming years. The economy is changing in important ways that are bringing 
employees into greater contact with non-employees in the workplace than 
ever before. Moreover, the nature of such interactions is also changing, as 
non-employees have inserted themselves into the traditional employer-
employee relationship and have taken on certain employing functions that 
make them a powerful force in employees’ lives. As employees and non-
employees interact more frequently and in ways that both directly and indi-
rectly impact the terms and conditions of employment, it is imperative that 
the law provide a strong, unified framework for addressing the discrimina-
tion that arises from such interactions. 
Such a framework is further necessitated by the fact that discrimina-
tion is becoming increasingly complex. Fortunately, the days of whites boy-
cotting businesses that hire black employees seem mostly behind us. But 
this hardly means non-employees no longer discriminate against employees. 
In some ways, the type of discrimination that has emerged in the twenty-
first century—subtle, unintentional, and often unconscious—presents an 
even greater challenge for antidiscrimination law. Is an employer as guilty 
of discrimination when it bases employment decisions on customer feed-
back that neither it nor the customer realizes is tainted by inadvertent bias 
as when it allows a customer to sexually harass an employee? Probably not, 
but under the existing law there does not seem to be much of a difference. A 
                                                                                                                           
by colleagues, neighbors, or friends, which causes recipients to feel that people do not like or 
accept them, thereby lowering self-esteem and leading to depression); Derald Wing Sue et al., 
Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical Practice, 62 AM. PSYCHOL. 
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atic for recipients, who must try to decide whether the discrimination was deliberate or uninten-
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new framework is needed that is both broad and flexible enough to apply to 
all types of non-employee discrimination in a fair and equitable manner. 
Although non-employee discrimination can be extremely nuanced and 
complex, the analytical framework for assessing employer liability for such 
discrimination can and should be much simpler. In all cases of non-
employee discrimination, whether conscious or unconscious, direct or indi-
rect, employer liability can be distilled to two straightforward questions: 
Did the employer know or should it have reasonably known about the dis-
crimination, and if so, did the employer act reasonably in response to the 
discrimination? This new framework recognizes that discrimination by non-
employees differs from discrimination by employees. It unifies the existing 
approaches into a single standard. It also creates a fairer standard of liabil-
ity. And it can be applied with equal effectiveness to both the easy and the 
hard cases. This approach will protect employers and employees alike as 
non-employee discrimination becomes an even greater challenge in the fu-
ture. 
